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INTRODUCTION

Th e United States of America has enough nuclear explosives
to allot tvvo tons of dynamite to every man, woman, and child on
this earth~

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it's primary

opponent in the · world's balance of power, and a nation vvhich has
declared that irreconcilable differences exist between itself and
every non-socialist country, has developed a similarly horrific
arsenal.

Both nations have appointed themselves as the protectors

of vast spheres of influence and this has been accompanied by a
great web of military alliances that have entaiied a vvorldwide
ar~ed

presence .

Often the forces of each side are deployed so

closely , they can

eith~r

bombard one another with propaganda from

sound trucks or, on other days, hold up Playboy pin-ups for the
enemy to oggle.

Since World War II, the United States and the

Soviet Union have engaged in an unabated arms race that has produced not only the enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons, but
also worldwide comrtlunications networks that extend beyond the
earth's atmosphere, ultra-sophisticated conventional weaponry,
chemicals that produce instant death when minute quantities come
in contact with human skin, and methods of delivering a warhead
weighing several tons t o within several hundred feet of a target ,
after a flight of over seven-thousand miles at twenty times the
speed of s01).nd~
All this would lead the rational thinker to conclude that
the U.S . and the Soviets are certainly heading rapidly towards a
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rather destruc t ive war , an<}indeed he would only have to pDint out
the militaristic tendencies of the human race to sUbstantiate his
claims.

Over the course of written history, some 3400 years ,

there have been only 23 4 years without war.

Since World War II,

armed conflicts have broken out · fifty-five times~ ai'1lple testimony
to the. fact that mankind still seeks to redress his grievances
by the sword .
Yet the United States and the Russians have riot gone to war.
Despite the hatred of the two systems for each other .

Despite

the high level of military capabilities and preparedness . Despite
~he

continual tension that has fathered dozens of confrontations

which have produced more tensions.

The fact remains that neither

side has ever hurled even a small fraction of its nuclear forces
at its enemy, much less a minor or major attack utilizing conventional forces .
It is the ultimate paradox in the nuclear age where paradoxes
are the rule.

The two strongest nations in the world arm them-

selves to the teeth so as not to have a war .

Protective devices

such as the anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) lesson stability
while invulnerable weapons enhance it.

Plans to reduce the se-

verity of a nuclear war should one actually occur are viewed as
promoting the holocost that we all seek to avoid.

Even moves

designed to strengthen deterrent sanctions subjecting the attacker
to more devastating destruction often have the opposite and end
up making the possibility of an atomic 'Nar less and less remote.
What it all boil s dovm to is a game betvleen us and

them~

( 3)

Each side is playing with its ov'/n set of

ru~es

and as such, the

contestants have different ideas as to what constitutes an infraction, but as in all games, each is struggling to stay ahead .
However, what makes this nuclear weapons game unique is that
neither side is willing to make the effort to defeat its opponent
and thus bring the game to a conclusion.

Each combatant is forced

to play but is in the dark about the way to win and the very nature
of the grunes decisive moments.

In fact , there is a great deal

of doubt as to whether a Victory is possible at .all.
Franklin D. Roosevelt said that we had nothing to fear .but
fear itself .

Yet today, the game that has taken on international

proportions between the Americans and the Soviets has remained
peaceful precisely because of fear, fear that the slightest arrned
confrontation between the two powers could escalate to the point
of nuclear devastation for both sid.es, leaving no one a winner.
No doubt the whole world has paid the price of sustaining the
atmosphere of supreme danger and for sure one must wonder about
the durability of mere mnrtals under such adverse conditions,
however, the fact remains that great powers have never before been
so convincingly deterred from plunging themselves and/or a great
many other nations into war.

It has been said that numerous

issues would have led to bloodshed between the Soviets and ourselves in the . pre-atomic age~

Furthermore, it should be kept in

mind that under the shadow of the two nuclear giants, many other
countries have either limited their military posture, such as
We st Germany and Japan, or refrained from using their own nuclear

\lveapons , even under pressure as is the case wi t h Israel.
uW{no~m,

and the

study of nuclear strategy leads us to an empirical blank.

Except

It is only natural that man should fear the

for the two small bombs dropped on Japan at the davID of the atomic
age, no fission or fussion devices have ever been detonated out
of anger~

But man has usually overcome his fear of the unknovYn

and stumbled forward , and the question of why not here remains
to be answered.
The difference between man ' s past willingness to summon the
courage to explore the unknown and his present unwillingness to
use nuclear weapons can be explained by the · tremendous risks invol ved ·with the latter.

vrnat nuclear weapons have meant to war-

fare is that even though you may completely destroy your opponent ,
he may in turn be able to annihilate you despi t e the fact that he
has ceased to function as a civilized society.
'may'.

The key word is

If the risks were known precisely, one nation or the

other could come up \-nth what it felt to be adequate safeguards
and subsequently launch . an attack , however no one is quite sure ,
or for that matter, even remotely sure, about the consequences
of the use of nuclear weapons and therefore , no one can be sure
what risks need to be defended against • . It is precisely this
grey area that forms the backbone of deterrence and insures that
neither the United States not the U. S.S.R. will inaugerate the
use of nuclear armaments, either tactical or

strategic~

Our fear of fighting an atomic war is compounded by the

in~

cre.dible awesomeness of hardware posessed by the U. S., and the So-

viet Union.

A felt" exa.'!lples should suffice to show the scale of

technological developments.

One-half pound of pre s sure per square

inch exceeds the force of a hurricane wind by a factor of two
or three and five pounds psi will knock dovm a house.

Yet to

withstand an attack from Russian intercontinental'ballistic missiles (reBl/Is), our Minuteman Ills have been placed in silos that
can bear the force of one-thousand pounds per square inch~
Legau~t

Al,b ert

and George Lindsey tell us that all the bombs dropped by

Allied forces on Germany during the Second World War had the combined power of approximately

1~300,OOO

tons of TNT, or 1.3 megatons.

As of 1974, the total number of nuclear explosives available in the
world was equal to fifty-thousand megatons!
Now our rational thinker woUld be led to believe that under
the threat of such profound danger, both side s would not only
agree to methods of avoiding war, but also 'would rest contently
one they posessed forces , which cOTJ.ld deal out a few million casualties to each other.
far from the case..

Painfully, as well as obviously, this is

As for the United Stat es , we don't really

trust in deterrence 8 and we don't understand the Russians so we
push on VIi th newer and costlier developments, constantly increasing
our military might whil e concurrently feeling that our se curity
is decreasing?
The Soviets are a completely different case because their way
of thinking, attuned to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, is in many
ways fundamentally distinct from our own.

I will discuss the

numerous ra.mifications of thi s later on but in general, they have
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thought in terms of what might happen if there was a nuclear war
while the United States has built its strategy almost exclusively
around the prevention of such a war~O

At the present time, the

Soviets are revelling in the fact that they have achieved essential parity with the United States but is is unsure to u s , and
perhaps to them as well, as to what the implications of parity
\'vill be.
The purpo se of thi s paper will be to arrive at some sort of
understanding about the real importance of nuclear weapons in the
hands of . the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., something which has not been
done heretofore in as skilled a fashion as" is possible.

There are

a number of reasons for this, some of 'w hich are worth looking into
hecause of the impact they have had on the actual policies of the
United States.
Many, if not most of the books and articles vrritten about the
strategic ,balance come from the pens of military academicians who
are prone to discussing weapons outside of the political framework within

which they are to be deployed.

According to Uri

Ra' anan in testimony given before the Senat e Subconuni ttee on
ll
'National and International Operations:
Sure'ly, weapons systems and military power in general cannot,
or should not, be evaluated except in relation to the overall
political postures that they are meant to serve.
'
Therefore, I especially intend to look at the likelihood of the
various proposed sc'enarios actually taking place.
Another problem with the literature on nuclear strategy and
the nucle ar balance between America and the Russians is one which

(7)

i s ha.rd to avoid in many are as of learning, namely, the author
with his

O~TI

axe to grind provides a distorted view of things

when he sets forth his ovm interpretations or conclusions.

The

result has been government officials telling one story, frustrated
arms ~limitation

negotiators another, and hardware buffs yet a third .

Time and time again, alarmist authors

wou~d

serve warning about

the numerous strides which the Soviets have been making of late
and contend that we would soon be helpless against a massive attack ,
all the ",..hile totally ignoring the fact that we have 41 near-in"-v~nerable

missile submarines which by themselves are capable of

destroying a great percentage of Russian society.

It can not be

ignored, as is so often done, that the United States and the Soviet
Union have the power to destroy each other and furthermore, will
continue to maintain that capability~2

This the basis of de-

terrence and all discussion about the nuclear balanc e must eminate
from this.
I have chosen to enter this debate. because I feel I can aD"

proach it far more objectively than most.

My mind has b e en and

remains open to all arguments and I have been under no pressure
to rna.lee black and white decisions, a choice which professional
writers ofnn seem compelled to make, but one which often does
not do justice to all the variables involved. .
Thi s study deals specifically with the Sbviet Union and the
United States.

I have touched upon the issues of proliferation,

China, and the Third Vlorld only where they directly affect the
relationship between the tvvo superpowers.

While these three

(8)

variables will exert more and more influence in the not too distant
future, at present , they are subserviant to the strategic cons.iderations which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. attach primary concern to.
Finally, I 's hould mention that I assume the reader to have
some basic lmowledge of the materials and concepts involved"

I

will however, stay away from the technical oversophistication
that pervaded the literature and bombards one with cold facts,
something which I believe contributes to our forgetting that even
one nuclear warhead delivered to a major city would be nothing
short of a disaster .

(9 )
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NUCLEA...-q WAF,.-CHANCES AND CONSEQUENCES

There is absolutely no way of knowing if nuclear weapo?.Ls will
ever be used.

Those who tell us to scrap our stockpiles because

there is no possibility of its being used hold no less

gro~dless

assumptions than those Yiho propose that we arm to the hilt to fend
off the impending onslaught upon our society.

The best we can do

in lieu of a crystal ball is to take a look at the crisis behavior
of both sides, and in particular, the Soviet Union.

Additionally ,

a brief discussion . of the consequences of a nuclear war is called
for to place things in perspective.
The physical destruction that would foli ow the use of nuclear
weapons in a war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has
been dealt with in fine detail by a spate of authors, most of
whom wrote during the panic-fille·d Fifties, so only a quick rehashing is necessary here.

Each s,ide could inflict 100 milli.on

casual ties on its adversary even aft.e r absorbing a first strike~
If the United States attacked the Soviet Union with one-hundred
megaton weapons from the many thousands it has at its disposal ,
the former could destroy sixty percent of the latters industry
and fifteen percent of the population.

Four-hundred of these

weapons would knock out seventy-five percent of the U.S . S.R.'s
industrial capacity and kill thirty percent of the population;
the actual casualty rate from fallout and radiation would be .

double~

It should be noted at this point that McGeorge Bundy has

claimed t hat the Russians would be deterred from launching a
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nuclear attack if 10 of their major cities and perhaps as little
as one or two were destroyed?
If Vie reverse the tables and look at the results of a Soviet
attack upon America, therfigures are equally horrifying if not more
gruesome because of the concentration of the population in a few
large cities.

A singl'e 20 megaton device exploded over New York
~other

City would kill 6 to 8 million of its residents and
people in the Greater Metroplitan

Area~

million

For that matter, any city

with one million inhabitants subjected to the detonation overhead
of a megaton bomb or warhead would stand to lose 360,000 people
killed and 90,000 more injured according toa United Nations

study~

Even if the Russia.ri$ chose to attack only our missile
,-

silos and spare the American population, a maximum of twenty-t'v'lO
million people could be expected to die~
This leads us to ask if the living would envy the dead.

While

several ,individuals have suggested that an all,-out nuclear war '
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would render the Northern
Hemisphere uninhabitable, this is simply not true!

Both nations

could survive a nuclear hOlocost~ despite the fact that the ozonelayer of the atmosphere would be seriously depleted causing crops
to be killed, a change in climate, a drastic increase ' in skin
cancer, and the inducing of intense sunburns after only a few
minutes out of doors?

In the event that twenty million people

were killed, a total economic recovery could be achieved in about
10 years.

However, if 80 million died, ' it would take the survivor$

fifty years to regain their previous standard of living.

It would

( 12 )

take one-hundred years to undue the hell of 160 million Americans
dying in an atomic Armageddon~O
Yet despite the horror of the actual attack as well as the
pain of enduring the secondary effects caused by damage to the
environment and the various associated biological deviations, it
seems that the survivors would be able to carryon.

Says Herman

Kahn: II
Despite the widespread belief to the contrary, objective
studies indicate that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the
increase would not preclude mormal and happy lives for the
majority of survivors and their descendants .
This fact notwithstanding, it seems that both the U.S. and Russia
would, after a nuclear exchange, have lost their positions of world
power, a price neither . of them is willing' to pay.

Even if the

damage to one of the superpowers exceeds that of the other(allowing
the Soviets to rebuild their society in twenty years while it
takes us thirty), any .subsequent

long~range

advantage will have

been achieved at intolerable cost .
There are obviously dozens of solid reasons why the use of
nuclear weapons would not be in the best interests of the United - .
States or the Soviet Union however I wish to touch on one which
has the most ramifications , namely, the question of

proliferation'~

Herman Kahn has argued that onee "nukes are used, every nation
will try to get their hands on some.,,12

Indeed, six countries

have already detonated atomic or hydrogen devices and a substantial number of others have the requisite scientific knowledge
within reach.

It is generally agreed to , by both the U. S. and

the Russians, that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes the greatest threat to world peace as maintained by the
bipolar balance of power.

Not only will these nations no longer

be burdened by the taboo against crossing the nuclear threshold,
their unleashing of these weapons against any opponent will provide the easiest way for · the two superpowers to slip into a strategic war that they both hope to avoid.
America

~~d

Russia can

m~~age

Even if one assumes that

to stay clear of third party wars,

the instability that will ensue will be to the detrement 6f both
of us.

The fact that powers such as India and France merely po-

sess nuclear capabilities which have never been used has proved
destabilizing.
The literature on,atomic warfare, in addition to postulating
the probability of such a war and its likely physical effects,
has also tried to construct meaningful scenarios regarding the
course of battle once deterrence has failed.

Only recently have

the fortune tellers realized that nobody can be sure of what will
happen once the nuclear threshold has been crossed and. that this
very uncertainty is what has kept us alive.
It has been claimed that the first use of "nukes" will be
vigourous but that after the initial exchange, there will be an

13 .

immediate ad hoc cease fire.

On the other hand, last year,

George Kistiakowsky told the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.'ittee
that: l4
••• once a nuclear exchange begins, to convey to the other
side conVincing information which the other side will accept
as to where you will stop, will not be possible and therefore, the other side will necessarily respond and I think

(14)
the whole thing will escalate .
Others have stated that once the threshold is crossed, both sides
will withhold some of their forces so as to be able to engage in
controlled escalation and war-bargaining , however this suggestion
is also of dubious validity because the Russians, at least in
their vrritings , have rejected war':"bargaining either through controlled use of de-escalation15 and have instead opted for a pol.
1CY

0f

1 aunc h -on-warn1ng.
. 16

This means that as soon as the Soviet

early warning network detects an attack by the United States ,
they will launch their retaliatory forces rather than gat"Ilbling on
their missiles and bombers riding out the onslaught .
The U.S. has been deliberately ambiguous about its ovm intentions , and it has always stopped short of unconditionally ruling
out a launch-on-warning policy.

For one thing, this type of

response is a clear invitation to Armageddon and secondly, it is
rather risky because if the other side becomes . convinced that it
can bypass or destroy our early warning systems, they may be less
inhibited about launching an attack.

As a corallary of this, if

the President believed that our forces were vulnerable and there-fore should be launched on warning, he could be prompted to " press
the button" too soon!7
As it stands now, we have tried to sustain a strategic pos- .
ture that will enable us to ride out a Soviet first-strike and
allow us the option

0f

'
b ac k on "our re t a I·1a"t·1on.18
ho ld 1ng

The ability to hold back retaliatory forces that have survived
an enemy attack is an extremely important one because as long as

(1 5)
the losing side has escalation options, the winning side or the
side that has initiated the hostilities can not push its opponent
t o desperation~9

In fact, if we assume that the damage from a

first wave of nuclear strikes would be imbalanced among the com- .
batants, then the weaker side might have a better positon from
which to bargain.

This further paradox of the nuclear age has

been described by Richard Rosecrance in his excellent study of

" d e~errence
,.
~ 11 ows: 20
s t raeglc
as IO
t
Suffering the greater civilian damage and perhaps also the
greater redll:ction in its land-based missile forces, the
weaker side might threaten escalation of the strikes to
bring a substantial proportion of the enemy's population
under att·ack. At this later stage, such a threat would be
more credible than at the beginning of a conflict. The
disadvantaged side, with its back to the wall, could claim
that because of the attrition of its ovm force and the
suffering of its population if could no longer guarantee
to spare the opposing population.
Thus it would follow that the side better off would cease its
hostile actions to preserve its victorY and spare its people
from a nuclear holocost .
Anoth.er reason why we are unsure as to exactly what will.
happen during a nuclear war is that a whole set of scientific
phenomena associated with the use of fission and fussion devices
exist that can not be sub j ected to study.
an offense

cov~d

It is presumed that

set of a very high altitude megaton burst which

would cause a large and sustained plasma cloud, effectively hiding
~
21
subsequent missl"1 es .Lrom 1 ong-rangeraaar.
.&>

Similarly, it has

been reported that cominunications between missil.e submarines
( SSBI'is ) . and land-based command and contro·l networks would be

(16)

j ammed by a few large-scale detonations in the ocean .
It is pro.bable that the electromagnetic pulses (ErvIF) generated by nuclear explosions will have a sUbstantial effect on the
conduct of atomic warfare , but as in the above phenomena, how
much is unknown.

EMF can penetrate launch facilities as well

as hardened silos to destroy electronic equipment and completely
erase computer memories, even if the supporting structures withstand the blast overpressure~2

This is associated with another

process called fratricide which serves to limit the number of
missiles which can be deploye.d against a single target in successian.

According to Rosecrance : 23
when a numoer of incoming warheads are targeted an a relatively dense cluster of ICBM silos, their explosions cause
crater debris, shock waves, and nuclear clouds which reduce
accuracy and penetration of subsequent warheads.

Additionally, fratricide, if it did defl ect subsequent missiles
by high winds or cause their heat shields t 'o burn maturely t might
simply disable their warheads so they could not ex:plode~4

Of

course, this process will also work to thE}'fletrerrien-t of the country
being attacked because these same dynamics would pprevent any of
the besieged missiles from being launched, something referred to
as the pin-dovm effect .

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the least
inconclusive method of discerning the chances of nuclear war is
to study crisis behavior because it is assumed that such a conflict
will eminate from a great heightening of tensions rather than out

of the blue, a prospect which will be discussed. later on.
Because crises will tend not to be exacerbated if supported
by preoedence and observable thresholds~5 it can be said that the
present balance is stable in a crisis-stability sense~6

Even

though one side or the other may be perceived as posesSing a
strategic advantage, assurance and morale are more likely to be
the guiding forces behind a nations crisis behavior, not military

superiority~7

It is confidence that allows one nation involved

in a crisis to threaten irrational punishment to an adversary
that, while it could lead ·to onels own destruGtion, it necessary
to prevent the outbreak of war~8 ~y virtue of the fact that theSe·
threats are naturally ambiguous with regard to timing, substance,
and so forth, it is easier

~or

one or both countries to back off

from a "risk of warn rather tha.l1. a certain threat, and thus avoid
crisis escalation~9
It is in a crisis situation that the issue of force vulnerability achieves the most prominance.

If a nation feels that a

certain portion of its offensive weaponry is susceptable to being
destroyed if the enemy launches an attack, its confidence will
be seriously eroded and the likelihood of its making a rash move
that cou~d ignite the tension into war is greatly increased~.o

In

other words, if the risks of not striking are very high, the -vulnerable nation will not . be deterred, even vvi th substantial deterrent sanctions}l

Clearly, a pre-emptory attack prompted by the

seeming imminence of an all-out war, whether motiVated OlJ.t of
weakness or strength is not the wisest course of action.

We must

(18)

always faver .our hepes that a helecest can semehew be averted
because both the Soviet Unien and the United States have

~much

megatennage, that a pre-emptery attack with the purpese .of reducing
the subsequent damage te .oneself ceuld still net prevent aweseme
destructien tc beth sides~2
Befere mcving 'en te a discussien .of the crisis behavier .of
the United States and the U.S.S.R., .one mere paradex sheuld be
peinted .out.

That is, the incentives te reduce tensiens may be

mere than .outweighed by ether censideratiens, namely, that the
natien which makes the friendly moves tewards cenciliation is
likely te get a bad bargain that will weaken him and thus endanger
the overall balance.

Thus, Herman Kahn states that a natien cen-

ceeding eneugh te substantially ease a crisis may find itself
backed inte a rigid .or desperate

positien~}This

has many impli-

cations fer arms control that will be discussed later .

The question of

ris~-taking

prepensities and crisis behavior

, of the two superpowers is one which has baffled students .of international affairs since World War II, ' particularly wi th regard to
the Seviet Union vd th its penchant for secrecy and s,eerningly
contradictory foreign pclicies.

In the post-War period, it has

been the Soviets who have ccntinually tested and prcbed cur cchesion and determinaticn~4 acticns which seem consistant with
their belief. in taking the initiative.

Therefore if 'tVe accept ,

as I shall, that the risks which lead to crisis . which in turn
lead tc armed conflicts ar'e more likely tc eminate from Russia

~

(19)

than from the U.S., a strong emphasis on the formers behavior
is called for.

The act:l.ons of the United States will be tied in

throughout the discussion so that a complete picture should emerge .
While we normally attribute less rationality to the Soviets
regime, studies have shown that they have been just as cautious
as us in crisis behavior~5

And if one makes the distinction be6 it
tween a crisis risk and a war risk, which the Russians

d01

can be seen that even their risk-taking has followed a distinct
and rational pattern.

Jan Triska and David Finley, in their

Soviet Foreign Policy, did an in-depth survey of all Russian
military and diplomatic moves sincEYChe Second Vlorld War and they
discovered that inspite of common beliefs to the contrary, the
Comniunists had only taken low risks, and in';general, had acted
in a cautious, deliberate , and rational manner~7
tha.t : 38

They reported

The stronger the other partY ' in crlsls, the greater the
geographical distance' from the U. S. S.R., and the greater
the stakes involved, the more cautious the Soviet crisis
response ..
Triska and Finley have stated, as have others, that the Russians
will challenge tough but that they will always cease their manipul ation and withdraw from the competition when the risks of war
become evident~9
While the Soviet Union may share the trait of rationality
with the United States , it goes without saying that their process
of risk-taking . and crisis behavior is very different from : our
own40 and it may be that the real reasons for their taking and
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accepting risks may not appear at all in the Russian literature~l
However, Hannes Adomeit has authored a thor.ough study of Soviet
behavior for the International Institute 6f Strategic Studies and
has suggested tha.t: 42
In Soviet perceptions, the use of force and the acceptance
of risk in this process are subject primarily to criteria
of expediency, not legitimacy or morality. If Soviet military power can 'objectively' serve to further Soviet state
interests, and thus, by definition, strengthen world socialism, the accepta.71ce of risk is considered a priori as
I just'.
The Soviet view of world affairs has their relationship with
the United States continually operating in a hostile environment
and therefore risk-taking is built into the Communist system,
bridled only by external forces~3

However, the way in which the

Soviets perceive these ,external forces, such as the United States
has acted to restrain their daring.

In particular, the Russians

have placed a great deal of faith in science as a means

to~vards

obtaining power, and thus , they have had to respect both the
technological achievements of the U.S. as well as it's economic

strength~4

Thus, it should be kept in mind that although the

Soviets like to take. the initiative

and freely engage it: activities

that we could consider risky, these are by no means automatic
as their failure to respond to our mining of North Vietnamese
harbors testifies to~6

While the U.S.S.R. has proven to be

extremely opportunistic, their risk-taking and crisis behavior"
can not be interpreted as bringing us closer to the perils of a
world war .
The question remains as to how the United Stat es should act
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so that it can counter the Soviets and do so in a way that will
keep confrontations low-keyed .

Past experiences in Berlin and

Cuba tell us that "only by the calm deployment of unacceptable
risks " can we force the Soviets to back down in a way that will
guard against crisis escalation~7

Some people have argued that

in the event of a serious crisis that had reached war-risk proportions , bombers could be .sent on overflights as a warning48
but thi s could be judged dangerous for two reasons.

First, if it

was shot dO'iiTI by Soviet air defenses, this would . undoubtedly be
viewed as provocative by the Americans and the situation would
only be

exacerbat~d.

Secondly, given the Russian emphasis on

defense of the homeland, any incursion during

a time of crisi s

would b e es cal-atory~9 .
While any discussion of what constitutes calm yet unacceptable risks to the Soviet Union is obviously contingent to a
large extent upon the ' particular circumstances of the crisis , it
can be said (and I shall elaborate on this in the chapter on
future deterrence), that any moves on our part must, through a
credible chain, lead back to our strategic forces.

In other words ,

the Soviets must be made to believe that no matter how small our
response to their challenges, if they chose to stand up to us
rather than yield at the sight of our displeasure , we coul.d even"'::
tually resort to a nuclear attack.
In the past few years , it has been generally agreed that
the U.S . S. R. has achieved virtual strategic parity with the United
States , a s ituation presumably, that could alter the nature of
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Soviet risk-taking and thus force a change in our policy of dealing
with these initiatives .
50
that:

Triska and Finley reported back in 1968

the greater the Soviet weapons-military parity with the
West, the lower the Soviet perc.eption of risk in actual
East-West conflicts .
Adomei t , writing in .1973 , was unable to
that

th~re

substantiat~ . ,

has been no correlation between

increa~ed

this, claiming
Soviet mili-

tary might and her risk-ta.-1ring propensities, but that .in fact,
there had been no real test for this proposition~l

Continuing

his analysis, he addressed himself to the foreign policy experts
who had declared that the newfound Russian power would ma.-1ce them
less , a.-~d not more inclined to take risks. He writes: 52
... the political ~plications of military parity are not
altogkther clear, nor are the dirctions of future SovietAmerican relations. The analysis of the significance Of the
Soviet naval expansion and the strengthing of the militarystrategic and conventional potential of the Soviet Union
proved inconclusive, and while the tendency of the present
Soviet leaders to create, exploit, and manipUlate risks of
crisis has declined, it has existed in the past, even in
conditions of military-strategic inferiority. The argument
advanced on that basis-that parity will now ffia.-'ke them more
secure, 'more reasonable', and a priori less inclined to
take risks-is not entirely convincing.

Adomeit concludes that the Soviets are now engaged in a
process of learning from their ovm past mistakes which have often
been counter-productive as well as from the U.S . mistakes in
Southeast Asia., and that because of this, they vvouid rather. avoid
military confrontations altogether and
manipulation of the risks of war?3

sh~pe

the milieu without

While this would make , it

tougher for the Russia.."1.s t o show strength in the future, they may
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more than make up for this by a weakening of U. S. resolve that '
would accompany our perceptions of such a situation as detente .

In concluding this chapter on the chances of nuclear war,
I wish to point out what many observers feel to be the most probable avenue to an atomic holocost: human error or accident.

While

it i ,s useless to speculate on what kind of unforeseen circumstances
beyond the control of the United States and the Soviet Union could
lead us to a nuclear conflict, ,a tenuous situation involving the
commander of a Polaris submarine who is eXperiencing an unexplained
communications blackout is not difficult to imagine.

This one man,

if he perceives the need to launch his missiles, could lead us all
down the road to destru.ction~4

George Kistiakowsky, before the

United, States Senate Foreign Relations Committee" termed the danger
of our slipping into a nuclear holocost via the "back door" as
" quite significant,,~5
America and the U.S . S. R., realizing the profound importance
of containing human as well as mechanical error, signed a treaty
in 1971 to reduce the chances of' accidental war.

Among the pro-

visions of this agreement is a pledge by both signatories to
notify each other immediately of any accidental launches or de-

tonations~6
The improved communications between the two superpovvers
during times of crisis should also help to reduce the chances of
·either the U. S. or the Soviet Union becoming involved in an allout war subsequent to the use of atomic weapons by a third party.
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It has been suggested that Communist China , in an attempt to force
a confrontation betvveen the two superpowers might launch a catalytic attack, the scenario of which has the Chinese firing an
SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) towards the Soviet
Union from a position just offshore of the United States.

This

is unlikely because available tracking and detection methods would
recognize the nationality of the attacker, however other scenarios
involving Third World powers or even bands of terrorists become
more and more real as the nuclear cluhbecomes less and less
exclusive;>7
To summarize, the chances of our becoming involved "in a
nuclear war with the Soviet Union remain a great unknovm which ,
serves the cause of deterrence.

Neither the U.S. nor the Cornmun-

ists has been inclined to provoke serious crises that clearly
run the risk of escalating ·into war because the uncertainties ·
of such international .tension are no less feared by the superpowers than the uncertainties of a war itself.

While some may

argue that " danger clarifies a man's thinkingll~8 it is widely
recognized that crisis characteristics include an accelerated pace
of events, difficulties of coordination and control, dangers of
misperception, and inaccurate communication, and th.a t even a .working out of the "rules of the game" by Viashington and Mosc ow is
unlikely to harness the unexpected hazards of a real V'lar?9
Whether the Soviet achievement of paritYt or as some see it,
~uperiority,

will affect a change on their

thir~ing

is not now .

kno\"In and in any event, they ' have done very poorly in post-World
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War II crises and such factors as asymmetrical interests," commitments , and levels of resolve should continue to determine the outcome

0f

·
. . t Y.60
crlses
, no t superlorl
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR CAPABI,LITIES AND PERCEPTIONS

Since the end of the Second World War, the people of the
United States have believed that our posession of nuclear weapons
has served as a deterrent against the use of these devices by the
Union of . Soviet Socialist Republics.

In this chapter, I wish to

examine the nature of current American strategic thought

regar~

ding the fu.rtherance of this deterrence and compliment the discussion with a relatively brieft

rundo~m

of our hardware

capabilitie~

which are designed to enable us to implement the doctrine.

The

latter information will serve as a basis for the last chapters
analysis of fu.ture alternatives.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld sets forth the four
basic objectives of the strategic nuclear forces in the annual
Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1977.
follows: l

They are as

-- To have a well-protected, second-strike force to deter
attacks on our cities and people, at all times ;
-- To provide a capability for more controlled and measured· responses, to deter less than all-out attacks;
-- To ensure essential equivalence 1,vi th the USSR, poth now
and in the future, so that there can be no misunderstandings
or lack of appre=ciation of the strategic nuclear balance;
--To maintain stability in the strategic nuclear competition,
forsaking the option of a disarming first-strike capability
and seeking to achieve equitable arms control agreements
where possible .
RUtllsfeld states that the present force structure is adequate and
that : 2
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(e)ven after a well-coordinated surprise attack, the U. S.
could retaliate with enough power to destroy its enemy as a
modern, functioning society ,
but he warns that the balance is rapidly shifting away from our
fav-o r to the point where we "soon" may not enj oy this capability .
In painting a pi_c ture that reflects the predominate Pentagon
view that our current defense posture is secure but that in light
of massive Soviet efforts to achieve parity and possibly superiority,
we are obligated to move -vigorously to maintain a stable balance ,
the Secretary contrasts our considerable advantage over the

Rus~

sians in some areas with a few serious deficiencies in others .
Of primary importance is the knowledge that

,-/'/e

area number of

years ahead in nuclear weapons technology but that existing weapons systems are lacking in spare parts , are months behind schedul e
for being overhauled, and in some cases , are entirely obsolete~
The apparant brittleness of our forces is borne out by the fact
that stocks depleted by the 1973 Mideast airlift will not be
replaced unti 1981~
The four basic obj ect-i ves of our strategic nuclear force s as expounded by Rumsfeld point to the two predominate doctrine s
which provide- the backbone for all military thought ragarding
deterrence , the Nixon Doctrine, which Gerald Ford has left unchanged , and the Schlesinger Doctrine which continues despite
the departure of i ts namesake and intense scrutiny from the Congress.
The Nixon Doctrine propounds neither parity nor superiority
but rather, sufficiency .

As interpretec}by Jerome Kahan, it entails
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six main objectives : 5
--maintain an effective strategic retaliatory capability to
deter a surprise attack by any nation against the U.S.;
--preserve stability by reducing the vu~nerability of U.S.
strategic forces and thereby mini~ize Soviet incentive to
strike first;
--prevent the Soviets from being able to inflict considerably
more damage to America' s popu~ation and industr;r than we ·
could inflict on them;
--defend the United States against small-scale attacks and
accidental launches;
--develop flexible options permitting U.S. forces to be used
in controlled and limited ways;
--insure overall numerical balance doesn ' t become disadvantageous to us.
Perhaps the most important implication of all this is the apparant
rejection of the launch-on-warning . p·b licy, which as T mentioned
earlier, is highly destabilizing~
The Schlesinger Doctrine, announced in the Winter· of 1974,
is designed to strengthen deterrence by increasing . the credibility
of the ties between our opposition of any Soviet military initiatives and our deployment of nuclear weapons.

Former Secretary

of Defense James Schlesinger, acting out of a belief that our
military posture left us in a position of either having to

respo~~

to the Russians with a full-scale attack or with nothing at all ,
argued for flexibility that entailed retargeting some of our
Minuteman ICBMs away from population centers and missile silos ..
This flexibility, which essentially requires no new hardware! ·
will enable the United States to make limited counter-fbrce strike s
against the Soviets in the event that they try to overrun Europe .
While our assured-destruction forces were held back to prevent
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the Russians from attacking our

cities~ the s e limited strikes ,

it is claimed, would reaffirm our commitment to the Europeans as
well as prevent the war from escalating to uncontrollabl e levels~
In order for nuclear bombs and missiles to affect a de-escalation,
we would have to deploy them in such a way so as to assure the
Russians that our actions were limited and designed to end ho stilitie s , not achieve a victory..

However, these strikes would

have to disrupt enemy forces and introduce a pause in military
activitie s during vvhich time all possible diplomatic initiative s
could b e exploited~O
lilr. Schlesinger and his supporters from hoth inside and out ...
side government have noted that because the current credibility
of a full-scale retaliatory strike on Soviet cities is very low,
the new doctrine of limited ref?ponse improves deterrence and leaves
open the possibility of U.S . first use 'anywhere in the world~l
Yet t:ne critics remain staunchly unconvinced and they voci,ferously
assert that not only have we had flexible targeting for many

years~2 but that serious problems have been associated with this
option all along.

According to

a

recent study of the effect'a

U.S. limited counter-force strike might have on Soviet plans to
grap Europe: 13
••• a higher probability of a limited negative payoff may be
more than overbalanced by the small probability of a very
advantageous positive payoff, leaving a potential aggressor
with a net positive expectation.
.
If , for example , the U.S.S.R. was. not made to seethe evil of its
'Nays after the first American limited counter-force strike ' against
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targ.ets such as dams,and railway networks and they continued their
offensive, we would still have our backs to the wall.

It would

be foolish to think that onc e the Soviet Union had taken the
monumental political gamble of attacking Europe that she would be
deterred by the imposition of some limited internal damage.

Rather

than stopping, the Russians would be more likely to press on and
perhaps demonstrate their ovm resolve through a series of limited
attacks on the United States.

Even if they , opted to direct all

their military efforts at conquering Europe and did not conduct
reprisal raids, America would be in a position of having to again
inflict limited damage on the Soviets, with an increased degree
of uncertainty as to the " coercive power of such-a move, or, it
could increase the scope of the attack and risk escalation that
could bring on great destruction to the cities and industry of
both sides.

The decision would no doubt take s.ome time and while

we debateJ, the

Russi~s

could " continue their advance, " gra9

si~

zable chunks of Europe, and then declare a cease-fire.
At this point in the scenario, the United States must accept
the fait , accompli because any further attacks Yvhose purpose is t 'c)"
force the Soviets to withdraw will surely invite costs to our
homeland that override any possible gains in keeping Europe alligned with the West.
In seeking the correct strategy , if indeed one exists", i t
sholud be

reali~edthat

in no practical · manner can the American

strategic nuclear forces be linked with t he defense of Europe.
The belief that this link may exist , and that a Soviet assault
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on our troops will trigger massive retaliation, is most certainly
on the forefront of their minds and for that reason, no great change.
in the

Europe~~

status quo can be

~~ticipated.

But if deterrence

fails, we will have to rely on our theatre nuclear and conventional
forces .
A primary failing of the Schlesinger Doctrine is that it
forgets the great importance of resolve in conflict resolution.
The Soviet decision to take Europe vtill obviously reflect massive
doses of determination on their part, to which a U.S. show of
force vis a vis a limited attack will simply not be equal.

And

a mustering of sufficient. resolve ort our part, requiring us to
wrought. a sizable amount of destruction on the enemy, will · be too
likely to prove escalatory.

We can not and should not be willing

to lose New York to save Paris.
It h as been argued by Schlesinger that limited nuclear strike s
would be necessary to ' effectively counteract a Russian show of
resolve in a scenario that had them making some limited counterforce attacks on us while simu~taneously marching on Europe~4
my view,

a~y

In

coercive tactics by the Soviets designed to mil1imi z e

our involvement in the tactical defense of our NATO allies by
striking the United States could not possibly bbe seriously considered by the Kremlin.

The Communists will not dare. to sweep

across the European continent unless they detect a drastic diminishing of our resolve to the point thaf 'tve would b e more interested in preserving ourselves than risking a strategic nuclear
exchange that might turn the flow of battle in our favor.

In
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other words, the Soviets, before attacking, will presumably anticipate that we shall

acc.~pt

a defeat of our tactical forces.

Thus, a Soviet strategic attack, however limited, would,
for them ,
.
dangerously expand the theatre of war and possibly invite a strengthening of American resolve, clearly a counter-productive move.
Finally, the Schle s inger Doctrine fails to confront one of
the m.ajor dilemmas that has plagued those who have sought to
justify the use of nuclear weapons.

Because of the tremendous

destructive power of even the smallest kiloton atomic devices,
with their untold traumatic side effects, no one is in a position
to define what constitutes Jl limited".

Mr . Schlesinger himself

has said that the limited.attacks he .envisions would res1il:t in
between fifteen and twenty';'five thousand casualties;5 figures
which very conceivably could place us in a hostile and war-like
posture as s een through the eyes of the Kremlin and nec es sitating
a vicious retaliation.

Besides, it is no mean feat to convince

the enemy in wartime that the missiles raining dQ1;VTI on him are
designed to end the fighting.
If anything , this discussion of the Schlesinger Doctrine has'
highlighted the many uncertainties that'go hand in hand with the
posession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet
Union and make it virtually assured that security iii Europe will.
not be endangered.

I will expound on thi s more fully in subse-

quent chapters.
For nov'! though, I ' would like to turn to

a

survey of the

current military posture of the United St ates and examine the
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hardware in our arsenal that gives substance to our strategy.
Our offensive forces are basically divided into

~hree

separate

weapons ' systems, the Triad, consisting of bombers, fixed ICBMs ,
and submrine-launched ballistic missiles .

As currently deployed ,

the Triad mutually reinforces itself and insures that in the
event of two of the components ·.:being destroyed, the third will
still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S.S.R.
The strategic bomber force is the oldest of the three weapons
systems that make up the Triad , yet it is the most expensive to
. t aln.
. 16 The aircraft which provides the backbone of this
maJ.n
component is the Boeing B-52, a plane which can carry between
four and six hydrogen bombs of up to 24 megatons as well as 2
megaton-range missiles~ 7 On most missions, oldy one megaton bombs
will he used so · that six short range attack missiles (SR.MI) with
nuclear capability can be added to :, Bl,lppreSs air defenses~8

Thirty

percent of the b-52s are kept on continual grqund alert which
will enable them to take off and escape from the immediate areas
of thej:r bases upon warning of Soviet missile . launchings~9 and
recently , the Strategic Air COIIunand has been deploying them at
inland airfields to avoid the possible threat of depressed.,..trajectory SLBms~O
Current plans call for strike aircraft to penetrate Soviet
airspace at very low altitudes to avoid radar detection; attack
either preprogram..rned positions or ,targets of opportunity, ' and then
.
. ' t' er.21
continue on to friendly bases loca t e d aroun d th· e enemles
perlme

Whether the B-52 will be able to accomplish its Llissio-ns against
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the thick Russian air defenses can not be known for sure hOv'lever
most sources estimate that roughly fifty percent of the attacking
force · will get through~2

Sixty percent of our initial inventory

is 1ikly to be destroyed in a Soviet first strike~3 but the chances
of penetration by the remaining aircraft are not expected to be
greatly diminished because the latest enemy interceptors such .
as the Mig-25 Foxbat still lack sufficient technology to shoot
down low-flying p1anes~4
In addition to the B-52s, the U.S. maintains almost 600 aircraft in Europe, both land and sea-based, that are capable of
hitting Western Russia and the Ukraine with bombs of up to one
megaton in yield~5
Despite the fact that these planes will be useful well into
the 1980s and capable of destroying hard targets if equipped with
laser or television guided bombs, the U.S. has been developing a
new generation intercontinental bomber called the B--l ~6

This

plane, which former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger called
the most cost-effective force prograrnIfor the 1980s~7 will carry
almost. twice as much payload as its predecessor 28 and carry a
pricetag far in excess. of 20 billion dollars if the Air Force
gets the 244 it wants~9

The B-1 will offset any Soviet air defense

improvements but :r:ecently discovered design deficiencies reducing
the bombers speed from a planned Mach 2.2 to Mach 1.6 have serious
implications for its ability to escape its home bases significantly
faster than the B-52~0 - Congress has given firm support for the
program and a production decision is expected later this year~l
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The importance of the manned bomber as a retaliatory weapon
has been greatly diminished by the intercontinental ballistic
missiles introduced during the 1960s.

Deployed in both fixed land

posi tions and submarine,s, these warheads have been viewed as having
a far better chance of penetrating Soviet defenses .and it is only
within the last few years that the fixed missiles vulnerability
to pre-emptive attack has raised serious questions about their
efficacy.

It can be said that despite any doubts current planners

have about the land-based silo ICBM, these weapons will continue
to serve an essential function in the Triad· for the greater part
of the next decade.
The United States now has 1054 leEr-lIs; 54 Titan lIs with
single 5-10 megaton warheads, 450 Minuteman lIs with 1-:2 megaton
warheads , and 55.0 Minuteman Ills that carry three 170 kiloton
warheads , each in its own independantly-targetable re~entry vehicle (MIRV)2 2 Of the three, the latter is the most modern and
the most important and therefore is worthy of description in some
detail •.
The Minuteman III, which is still in production': 3 costs 4. 5 .
million dollars without its warhead but it remains the cheapest
. 34
part of the Triad to operate • . It has a circu~ar error probability

(CEP)35 of 1300 feet which gives it a single-shot kill capability
of only 44% against a silo reinforced to withstand 300 psi overpressure 36 however the MK l2A re-entry vehicle how being pl~ced
on Minuteman III will significantly enhance performance.

Incor-

porating the world's most advanced fuses and guidance systems ,

the PlIk 12A with a standard payload of three WIIRVed 340 kiloton
warheads will have a CEP of less than 700 feet which should give
it the consistent ability to destroy hardened targets?7
Al though the

I~l inuteman

III has been in service for over

five years, superior American tecbnology, which is significantly
ahead of Russian efforts in such areas as missile guidance, blast
effect, and re-entry vehicle s , has enable our ICBMs to stay in
the same league with the latest Russian developments?8

For

example, the new Soviet ICBWIs introduced during the last two
years do not carry decoys, equipment we deployed in the mid-

Sixties~9

In addition, the Command Data Buffer System that will

be completed by 1977 will allow us to remotely retarget a .Minuteman to anyone of at 1.east 8 different targets in 36 minutes ' and
allow the reprogramming of the entire force in under ten ho~_r-s~O
Finally, the United States is now sending'up a series of navi-,.
gational satellites that presumably will be used for mid-course
missile guidance that could give us accuracy Which can not be
equalled for years to come by the Soviets~l
Our Minuteman are deployed in 6 large areas 250 feet under-ground 42 in silos that can withstand 1000 psi and shiled against

EMP~3

However, it has been acknowledged by most scholars that

American .ICBMs will definitely become Vulnerable to a Soviet ·
first strike if they allocate enough mi s siles to the task and
improve accuracy and MIEV technology~4
Former Secretary of Defense: Clark Clifford stated in 1969
that if one anticipated the highest projec.t ed Soviet threat and
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the worst defensive circumstances , a U. S. second strike would
still destroy more than 40% of the Russian population and 75%
of the industry~5

Yet it stands to reason that as our ICBMs

become more and more vulnerable, the military will become all
the more nervous about its retaliatory abilities.

In the thirty

minutes warning time that we will have after a Soviet missile
launch;6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unconvinced that a sufficient
number of Minutemans could ride out the attack, could convince an
President
unsure/to fire our missiles , thus sending the nation to an uncertain fate.
As less that 25% of our deterrent resides in fixed ICBMs;7
the United States may de.c ide · to scrap these missiles altogether
or perhaps go to a

sys~em

of land-mobility.

The final third of the U.S. strategic Triad is the fleet of
41 Polaris and Poseidon missile-firing nuclear submarines, each
carrying sixteen SLBIVIs.

The older Polaris boats , first tested in

1960 , have subsequently been l'IIIRVed so that each tube contains
three , 200 kiloton warheads, while the

ne~Ner

Poseidon has 10 re-

entry vehicles per missile yielding fifty kilotons a:piece~8
a CEP of not much less than

With

t mile;9 our current.SLBMs are in-

capable of destroying large numbers of Soviet ICBMs and t herefore
they do not pose a serious first-strike threat~O
Roughly two-thirds of our SSBNs are on patrol at any one time~l
which means that this segment of the Triad alone is capable ,of
killing thirty percent of the Soviet population and knocking out
· 52 assu.Tlllng
.
nl
75'10, of it ' s industry in a countervalue attack,
a y
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routine attrition due to equipment failure.

Whether the Russians

could detect and destroy any of our sea-based missile deterrent
and thereby affect some damage-limitation is a matter of conjecture..

Like all other calculations about the losses to be incurred

during a nuclear war, we really have no idea as to how vulnerable
our subs are to Soviet ASW (anti-submrine warfare);3 however the
U. S. Navy has claimed that none of its Polaris boat.s have ever
been tracked, or even detected while on station~4
iVhile it may very well be that both the American and Russian
missile submarines are , for all intents and purposes, invulnerable
from an enemy first-strike;5 the commlinicati,ons systems that link
them to land-ba;sed decision makers are not and herein lies the
catch to what would otherwise be the safest and therefore the most
stable deterrent force.

Because of waters inability to sustain

radio transmissions, submarines must position t ·hemselves at
relatively shallow depths in order to receive . com:rnands~6

This

makes the force more susceptible to improved Soviet ASit/ and
furthermore, these signals are transmitted by massive electronics
networks which can not be hardened and which can be destroyed in'
a number of different ways .

A modified EC-IJO called Tacama is

now being put into service over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
which will serve as a backup command and control relay station
however it does not have the capacity to handle the large amounts ,
of detailed targeting information which may be requir~d~7
At present, United States SSBNs are generally superior to
their Russian counterparts.

Th ey are much' quieter and are more
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quickly

overhauled~8 but it has' been decided to develop an en-

tirely new underwater deterrent system so that we will have the
option of reducing the more vulnerable land-based forces.
more that 30 billion dollars for

a..'I1,

Costing

initial batch of ten, the new

system, called Trident , will consist of newly designed SLBThTs as
well as the submarines themselves~9

The Trident. SSBN, which

could be incorporated into the Navy sometime in 1979~0 will be
almost as long as two football fields, have a weight of 18,700 '
tons, and carry 24 missile tubes~l

When initially deployed, these

tubes will carry Trident I SLBfils with a range of 4,000 nautic,al
miles and a CEP of less than 1500 feet;62 these missiles villI
also bebackfitted in ten of the thirty-one Poweidon boats~3
Sometime during the 19,80s , the Trident I I SLBM, which will take
full advantage of the Trident sub's enlarged missile tubes , will
enter service carrying 14, 150 kiloton vlarheads that could be
launched from U.S. territorial
Obviously, the United

~aters~4

Stat~s

has other offensive systems

besides the Triad that figure prominantly in the nuclear balance
with the U.S.S.R. however before discussing these, I would lik;e
to take a quick look at our primary defensive systems.
The SALT I Treaty of 1972 put
defense systems .
we

stri~t

limits on active missile

Under the provisions of that bilateral pact,

spent 4 billion dollars on a single site at Grand Forks, North

~akota to protect against a Chinese attack and limited Soviet

strikes~5

The Safeguard anti-mi~sile system became operational
late last year,66 however, at the time of this writing, it appears
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that the entire project, with the exception of the sophisticated
radar, will be phased out, leaving our Minuteman deterrent force
protected only by their super-hardened silos~7
Through another series of de-activations of obsolete ordinance ,
the United States now has zero surface-to-air missiles (SAbi~)~8
and the modest Soviet bomber threat will instead be countered
by several hundred interceptors whose primaI""lJ purpose is peacetime patrol of American airspace .

This weakened

anti~aircraft

posture has been recognized by both the Army and Congress which
has recently voted funds for

lar~scale

deployment of the S.A..lVI-D,

an advanced missile that is now proceeding at . an exceptional pace
through its testing schedule~9

When in service, · the SAlVI-D wili

defend against any cur;rent or projected Russian bomber .threat,
even when attacks are made at extremely lovv al ti tudes over irregular terrain!O
Our ASW capabilities have never been hampered and thus it
is accepted by most observers that we are far s.uperior to the
Soviets in this regard: l having better technology as well as far
"
t ers, alrcra
"
ft ,ana~ ·f"
.
d to the J"ob 7• 2
moree
rlga t es asslgne
h 1 lCOP
The U.S . Navy expects to continually track Russian SSBNs and
destroy them immediately at the outset of awar7 3 however, according. to the respected Stockholm International Peace Research
Insti tute , we could localize most ·enemy subs but only under
" extremely favorable" conditions!4
The above weapons systems, ABM, SMJis , and ASW, all constitute
active defenses.

More often than not,

however~

they are brought
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into play by so-called passive defenses , such as radar and other
early warning devices.

Mosi;6otable among our strategic early

warning systems are the three satellites which orbit in such a
way so as to be able to remain above a fixed point on the earth .
By continually monitering Soviet launching sites, we will know
immediately when an attack has been inaugerated7 5

Defenses

against surprise' SLBM firings are still thin but newly developed
phase d a rray radars should fill in all the gaps before 19807 6
At the present time, the United States is engaged in a number of projects that will provide early warning against manned
attacks and cruise missiles , should the Soviets develop them,.
Three massive radar Sites, each looking in a di,f ferent ,direction,
are rtow being built that will give us the ability to look
the horizon by bouncing signals off the upper atmosphere7?

ove~

The

drawback of this system is that it is not as accurate or discriminatory as conventional radar and in northern, areas , it will be
subject to ionospheric disturbartces7 8 Ballistic missile early
warning systems are similarly limited and they can not predict
impact points to better than 200 square miles7 9
It is likely that the Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS), now being given deployment funding by Congress, will
serve as the most reliable and invulnerable early warning complex .
Essentially an electronics-stuffed Boeing 707 or 747, AWACS will
be ' able to detect aircraft flying a few feet above the ground and
double as a mobile command center if ground facilities are destroyed.80
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Thi s study of the offensive and defensive forces that would
be employed by the United States in the event of a war with the
Soviet Union has revealed that we are militarily strong and that
in some key areas, we are ahead of our opponents. The arsenat
contains sonie 100, 000 nuclear weapons 8l and ¥le are bUilding three
more every day.82 We have a virtual monopoly of forward based
8-'

systems.~

The Triad has given us diversity that complicates

defenses and counterforce strikes and guards against technical

breakthroughs~4 And vve maintain a

II

considerable superiori ty" in

counterforce capabilities that will c-ontinue even if no new programs are initiated~5
That we are militarily strong can not be denied but scores
of analy=ists embroile,d in the current fierce debate concerning
United States defense posture claim that we can- not be satisfied
with the state of ess ential equivalence vis a vis the U. S. S.R .
If one studies the overall strategic balance desregarding, the
many areas where one side of the other is ahead, -one sees that
the Communists have caught up to;" the United States and are moving
at a pace which make s them appear to be -gaining a limited degree
of superiority .

In a viorld where the perception is the reality ,

superiority for either side , though strategically meaningless ,
could have serious implications.
It has been suggested that the United States has grown bl as e
to the idea of strategic superiority because we were unable to
use it vrhen we had i t~6

Plus , ther.e is a widely accepted belief

that a Soviet advantage in the arms race will encourage them to

(4 6 )

engage in limited aggr,es s ion or support wars of national liberation;87 and some extremists warn that even more rash actions
could be expected .
On the other hand, academicians have been arguing that we
must extricate ourselves from the numbers game and realize that
as long as we are able to inflict unacceptable damage on the
Soviet Union , deterrence will prevail .
Current feelings among U.S. decision-makers tend toward the
belief that deterrence is not a substitute for defense , and "a
great deal of alarm has been expressed about the trend" which saw
defense spending drop 29% from 1968 to 1974, measured inconstant
1974 dollars~8
Amendment , has

A recent Congressional "r esolut;i.on, the Jackson
mandat~d

that the United States remain equal in

overall potential military effectiveness with the Soviet

Unio~89 '

and the latest defense budget provided most or all of the funds
reque$tec.· by the Armed Forces for major project s such as the
B-1 , Trident, and AWACS~O
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SOVIET :rnJCLE1\R CAPABILITIES ANTI PERCEPTIONS

Very bluntly, we have no provable theories on what makes
the Union of Soviet Socialist RepubJ.ics tick~

While some experts

have deduced the overall priorities of Russian policy formulation,
Gallagher and Spielmann in their Soviet Decision-Making ,for

TI~

fense, a dvise us in the West that our analytic attempts are
doomed to failure . They write: 2
Soviet policy should be interpreted as the product of men
whose actions are affected not only by the routines of
bureaucratic organization, the play of institutional interests t
the constraints of technology, and the logic of strategy,
,but a£so , 'end at least equally importantly, by the pecuJ,iar
demands imposed on them by the unique political ehviroriment
in which they operate.. There is, thus, a large and irreducible area of human choice involved in the process by which
the Soviet Union ·selects weapons systems and force posture s
that i$-hot susceptible to the predictive tools of Western
analysis.
There is a fairly broad consensus that Marxist-Leninist ideolog-,r .
has ' playc-d a large role in Soviet thinking about the use of nuclear weapons and a brief study of these beliefs is essential
to placing Russian global intentions in perspective ..
The widely held view that the Soviet Union wishes t o forecibly take over the world

~sing

all the means at it ' s disposal

simply does not square with the teachings of Lenin..

Russian

author A.S. Milovidov has recently published a book in which he
states that: 3
Experience has convincingly confirmed the correctne ss of
Lenin's thesis that (quoting Lenin) 'peace ••• will advance
the cause to an infini tely gre~ter ex~ent than v/ar • •• •
While it is made very clear that the Soviet Union i S , intent upon
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spreading socialism to every nation on eartht Milovidov also
establishes that 4
••• Communists consider defense of socialist conquests and
the prevention of a nuclear war to be the most vital task
of the present day.
It can not be emphasized enough that Russia seeks to avoid a
general nuclear holocost as much as we do?

However, as Leninists ,

they believe that Communism exists in a hostile world and that
wars will disappear only after the total destruction of rival
6

systems.

Therefore, the U.S.S.R. remains a lot less confident

that deterrence can be maintained, the reason for their trying
to develop war-winning capabilities.
According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine , in a great war, the
Soviet Union will emer.ge victorious, which is defined as selfsurvival and the destruction of capitalism.

In such a conflict ,

which is not taken to be inevitable; it is expected that the pro~
letariat will revolt .around the world and j oin forces -against the

" imperialists"~

The Russians assume in all their literature

that the final struggle, a general nuclear war, will be started
by the West, and indeed they are prevented themselves from in augerating hostilities by the Leninist ideology which preaches that
wars can be - in;itiated only if one is sure of winning and, gains
outweigh the costs?
At present , Lenin is exhaustively quoted in almost every
Soviet military publication, however the precise nature of his
influence can not be ascertained, norc-an we judge the importance
socialist doctrine will have in the future.

We are equally unsure
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as to which direction Communist Party ideology will push Soviet
military

objective~.

Paul Nitze va-ote in Foreign Affairs that if

the Russians gained a strategic advantage, their ideology would
have them exploit it~O however Philip Mosely told Henry J~ckson's
GoverYl...rnent Operations Subcommit t ee that a superior position would
make them more cautious . In :M osely ' s words: ll
From the Soviet point of view, the danger of war increases
as communism increases its strength and expands the areas
it rules. In other words, the greatest danger of war, in
view of Soviet ideology, arises as their power expands and
as their capacity to exert power ihcre.ases. . So, from their
point of view, the growth of their power, the fact that no
one 'vvould attack them today, that they have a secure deterrent
of their o'vm and could de's troy any other country in the world
today, this does not give them the sense of relaxing~ It
makes them feel the next stage is the most dangerous one
and that they must have the maximum power organized and
ready tcy6,se at that time.
. '.
This caution and the high state of preparedness that accompanies it are reflected in the Soviet view of its strategic nuclear relationship with the United States.

.

Gallagher and Spiel-

man.">J. claim that professional Russian analyists no\. . fully understand our military doctrines,12 and it is known that large numbers
of American nuclear treatises, including Taylor ' s Uncertain Trum.~

and Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreigg 1'olicy have

achieved wi.de distribution among the ruling circles in translated ,
mildly altered editions~3

Yet the U.S.S.R. ' s massive military

buildup of the past decade is assumed to have been formulated
" ."
14
with no precise formula for Soviet-American relations
and the
former still refuses t o believe in our good will, contending that
we would destroy them if given the chance.15
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Before looking at Soviet nuclear strategy, I wish to shed
a few insights into their thinking on an actual atomic war-hoy'!
it will come about and what form it will take.

The Russians believe that a nuclear conflict would begin with
a surprise attack of evolve out of a": limi ted one~6

Once started,

such a war would be an all-out fight to the finish involving mass
armies deployed throughout the world prepared to engage in protracted hostilities that bore no re1tion to conventional battles
of the past~7

If follows' that the Soviets place a premium on

getting off the first strike because they feel that the Side
which takes the initiative, especially in a surprise attack , could
very well insure that the outcome of the war is favorable;8 even

. t a
agalns

.

super~or

enemy.19

If the U.S.S.R. does exercise its penchant for taking the
initiative and resorts to the use of strategio nuclear weapons ,'
ei ther after U. S. first use in Europe or in the heat of a crisis.
in which an American launch seems imminent, she:will seek to
simultaneously destroy military targets and our economic base~O
In the event that the United States commences strategic strikes ,
most indications point to a Soviet launch-on-warning with the
similar objective of wiping out enemy forces-in-beingas well as
eliminating: all military and industrial poteiitial~l
While the idea of the Soviet Union believing it can

fight

and win a general nuclear war seems preposterous to American
forms of coITh.llon sense, we must remember that the Communists are
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much less afraid of thinking about the unthinkable and that , as
John Erickson has poonted out in a study for the Royal United
Ser-viices Institute for Defence Studies, there is a body of evidence
which shows that a first strike has been considered~2

The full

implications of this will be examined in a later chapter however
it may be that such an extreme stance by .the Russians regarding
nuclear warfare is a strong reinforcement to deterrence.

Fur-

therrnore , the Soviet doctrine of being able to fight an atomic
battl e to the finish once deterrence has failed should give
pause to supporters of the Schlesinger Doctrine and others who
trust that the Russians, with their largean,d inaccura,te 'warheads,
will adhere to damage..,..limitation and"no-c.ity or no-escalation

polici es~3

IvIichael MccGwire has succinctly summarized Soviet nuclear
strategy as follows: 24

..

---a high value is placed on reducing the amount of damage
inflicted on the So.viet Union, in protecting the center of
government anc}1.n preserving the population.
---Western Europe assumes a cruci<li importance as an alternative economic base on which to rebuild society.
---a high value is placed on destroying the West's warfighting potential as well as her existing forces.
These national objectives generate the fqllowing military requiremertts:
---destroy Western strategic nucle a r delivery systems at the
outbreak of war in order to reduce the amount of damage
inflicted on Russia and to deny the West the option of
holding back strategic missiles, which could be used to
influence the subsequent course of the war and to destroy
Europe as an economic base .
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---provide $ufficient active and passive protection to the
locus of central government to ensure its ability to function
at an acceptable level. To provide more widespread passive
protection so as to ensure the survival of an adeQuate -proportion of the population, and a skelatal frameword of national government.
~--develop a concept of operations for the seizure of Europe
at the outbreak of war, which 'will spare Europe's industrial
and agricul tural capacity to the greatest practicable extent ..,
---destroy the Viest's war-making capacity, both the forces
in being and its war potential.
For the remainder of this chapter, I will dwell on the effect
of these Russian beliefs and objectives on a stable nuclear balance
between the superpowers , then move on to adapt these to a Soviet
perspective on detente, and finally touch upon their military
hardware and the great stockpiling of the last decade.
Implicit' :in Mc cGwire ' s ,o utline is a rejection 'Qy the U.S.S . R.
of the American policy ' of mutual assured destruction (MAD ) , a .
policy which insures that any major strategic exchange between
the superpowers will . re.suJ. t in totally unaccepta-ble damage to
both sides. - The Soviet s want to surVive a nuclear holocost and
they assert that a peace pased on the terror of MAD can only
perpetuate the threat of war~5
It is obvious that the Russian emphasis on defense is regarded
as destabilizing by the Uni ted_ States which believes that deterrenc e
is best served through the mutual Vulnerability of both sides .
Yet the former nation has ' refused to compromise its strategic
doctrines or eschew certain types of weapons that we believe increase the chances of nuclear war .

For eXGL-nple, initial deploy-

ment s of Soviet ICBMs were all soft-sited even though thi s indi-
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cat ed a first-strike intention to America~6
Recent debates about detente have brought the question of
the superpowers affecting each others strategic stances t o ahead .
As has become clear, the objectives of both sides in promoting
detente have been very different and .in the case of the United
States, incorrect perceptions have more recehtly led to serious
disillusioYl.lIlent that could re·s ul t in increased, not decreased
tensions.

A report released by the Defense Intelligence Agency

in the Pentagon, that strongly contributed to the firing of James
Schlesinger, demonstrated that the Soviets view detente 27
••• as a strateg",{ for achieving broader U. S. S. R. strategic
objectives and tactical aims without causing sufficient
concern to galvanize serious counteraction by the West •••
The main points of the, study were as follows:
---Soviet •• • objectives • • • include the breakup of Western
alliances ; eviction of the American military presence from
Europe and achievement of Soviet military dominance there.
---detente has become possible, the Soviets believe, because
the West has been forced to recognize thEi:hanging correlation
of forces and is therefore accomodating to ris.ing Soviet
power ..
---A major tenet of Soviet detente policy is to avoid strategic nuclear war. At the same time, they seek to neutralize
those areas of power competition where superior U~S. technology puts the U.S.S.R. at a disadvantage .
---the U.S.S.R. expects the West to act with prudence in any
crisis that could lead to a superpower confrontation, while
the Soviets are prepared to exploit cris~s in pu~suit of
their objectives to the limits of U.S . reaction, if necessary ,
by threatening military intervention.
---Soviet detente policy. can change ••• Moscow 'v',rill compromise
on detente of discard the policy ~~d adopt an alternative
course ( if these options appear sufficiently attractive }.
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Detente, therefore, does not constitute a fundamental change
in Soviet policy as some Americans had claimed, but merely represents a bolstering of peaceful

co-exist~~ce

which means no hot

wars~8 Marchall Shulman clearly warned Congress in 1975 that: 29
(t)here should be no misunderstanding that the Soviet political strate~J of peaceful co-existance does not imply that
the Soviet Union renounces its ultimate commitment to the
further advancement of communism, or that the Soviet Union
will not take advantage of opportunities that present themselves for an increase of Soviet influence, it does, however,
signify a lower tension policy and a reli~~ce upon longer
term developments to validate Soviet aspirations.
Additionally, we should not expect that the spirit of detenwvdll
mean any lessoning of the arms race.

Whether coincidentally or

otherwise, th¢nternational st"ature of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has risen with their military power beginning
in the late nineteen-s'ixtie s and continuing at the present time~O

The Soviets believe that size and numbers are power and their
present military posture reflects' this~l

In the last few years,

they have spent between $30 billion and $45 billion to develop
and deploy an advanced series of ICBMs that give them a current
three-to-one advantage in missile

throw-weight~2 The new SS-18~

can carry a 50 megaton warhead as compared to the Minuteman's 1
megaton1 3 and it has been said that 100 megaton warheads are .

available~4

In an alternate configuration, the SS-18 carries

eight MIRVs and this combined with a CEP of one-half nautical mile 35
gives it the ability to destroy "any known fixed target" in the
.

"36

words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Brown.

To compliment the SS-18 , the Soviet s , in 1975 1 put the SS-17
and the six-M IRV SS-19 into service in newly designed 4 50 psi

silos~7

These silos, for vvhich the United States has no equivalent ,

utiliz e the. cold-launch or "pop-up " t e chnique that thrusts the
missil e above ground before its engine s ignite, thus allowing
for greater throw-weight s and permitting silos to be reused~8
A companion ICBM, the SS-16, which mayor may not be operational ,
is b elieved to be land-mobile~9
The backbone of the Soviet Rocket Force remains the 270 SS-9s
carrying three, 5 megaton warheads or ~ singl~ 25 megaton warhead~O
These are deployed in .group s of 6 that are often located near
cities , a fact which cas,ts serious doubts upon :A,merican intentions
oflimiting damage to t,he enemy population1 1 Furthermore, the 3S-9
with a relatively inaccurate guidance system that gives it only
marginal hard-target capability and an obvious potential for
obli t 'ering nearby non-military targets , exemplifies the Sovie t s
re j ection of damage-limitation theory.
As of mid-1975 , the Russians had the edge on the United States
in numbers of ICBMs with 1618, however because of extensive MIRVing,
we had more warhead s to deliver with a greater degree of accuracy~2
Approximately 700 medium and intermediate range, ballistic missiles
(M & IRBms) are also maintained, most aimed at Europe or China~3
Roughly 85% of Soviet ' throw-weight resides.in fixed ICBMs~4
which explains why the Russains are unwilling to ·plan on theIr
missile s riding out a U.S. first strike .

However,

r~cent

strides

in SLBMs could change this as the sea-based forces become a povter-
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ful deterrent force in their own right .
Until the early nineteen-seventies , the Soviets primary SLBM,
the SS-N-6 , could only count on destroying soft targets vYi thin a
relatively short distance of the coast because of range, yield,
and accuracy limitations~5

Now, these older missiles have been

given smaller unguided multiple re~entry vehicles (MRV)46 while
impressive new submrines and and SLBMs take over the primary
targeting

Being turned out at a rate exceeding
seven per year is an advanced Delta-class boat47 .that the Defens~
assigr~ents.

Department says uhas become a difficult vessel to locate and

track~ •• 1148

This SSBN is deployed with 16 missile tubes,each

carrying an sS-N-8 which has a range of over 4,000 nautical .miles
and thus is capable of hitting targets in the United States from
Soviet territorial waters~9
By 1977, the year in which theinterim SALT agreement expires,
the RUssians will have reached the 62 boat limit and will be
producing replacements or supplemental SSBrfs at a faster pace
than either the. Trident, which won't put to sea until 1979, and
then only at the rate of three·.: every two years, orUni ted States
attack submarines~O

With a current inventory of 800 launchers in

60 nuclear subs, the Soviet fleet is adequately counterd by American forces however, the future balance could be unstable if the
. latter believes its sea-basEd missiles are needed for war-fighting
as well as deterrence.51 .
A further Russian initiative which may be destabilizing is
the basing of cruise missile submarines in Cuba.

Such vessels,
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based in the Western Hemisphere in apparant violat ion of U.S.Soviet understandings, carry up to 8 high-kiloton warheads and
pose a severe threat to the massive industrial cOIIlplexes of the
Eastern seaboa~d:2
The sea-based nuclear forces of the U. S.S.R. are indeed formidable and the ambitious construction programs .of recent years
have undoubtedly eroded the sUbstantial American lead in this
area.

However, as has been the case with other examples of vast

Russian build-ups, increased size and numbers have not directly
translated into increased power.

It is. most obvious that despite

num.erous Soviet advancest they are still deterred-tb,ey are unable
to capitalize on nu-rnerical gains ..

Even if one imagines that

deterrence is doomed t9 failure , as all

V'lorst~caseplanners

na...,

turally do, the new generation of SLBMs will still be relatively
ineffective against hardened land-based missile silos which means
that surviving retaliatory forces can continue to credibly threaten
Sovie t society .

Furthermore, geogr·a phy and . superior Am.e rican

technology insures that the· Russian SSBN fleet remains partly
susceptible . to ASW: 3
While the Soviet SLBIVIs can admittedly cause some danger to
the United States, their .manned bombers, for all intents and
purposes, can not.

Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger

made this clear in his Fiscal Year 1976 report to Congress when
he stated that "no significant long-range bomber threat to the
U. S. howexists": 4 Since those · words were spoken,the U. S.S.R .
has built more than fifty Backfire supersonic aircraft;5 howev'e r
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these planes seem to present more of a menace to arms· control
negotiators than to the security of the United States which is
now preparing a modernized network of air defenses.

The precise

role of the Backfire, as well as the thousand or so other bombers

hav~~6 will be evaluated in the chapter dealing

which the Russians
with future nuclear

strategy~

Soviet defenses also reflect the "numbers and size" mentality
and as is the case with much of her offensive weaponry, technical
deficiencies make fyr vulnerability against Western hardware
which if often five to ten years ahead.
Protection agl;linst U.S. missiles consists of the world ' s only
ABlVI system, a 64-launcher complex protecting Moscow that, although .
it packs multi-megaton warheads, is generally considered ineffective by Western analyists~7

In December of 1975, Aviation Week

and Space Technology, the standard reference source on many milt:tary issues, reported. that the Soviets were using lasers to blind
our warning and recQnnaissance satellites, an activity, which if
not controlled by international agreement, could spark a minor
revolution in strategic thinking.

The Defense

D~partment

denied-

the report but it has become known that the Russians are interfering
with other American surveillance techniques legitimized by the
SALT agreements~8

Obviously, we will be preven~ed from firing

our missiles at the Soviet Union if we have no idea where to target
them.
The Russian ASW effort is weak.

They have no effective ca-

pabilities for open ocean ASW~9 and in fact,despite their highly
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publiciz e d expanding worldwide naval pr e sence , MccGwire believes
that all Soviet ocean-going forces are far from being able to
60
fully disccharge their war-related tasks.
They have 38 nuclear
and 160 conventional attack submarines 61 however the newest V-class
which h as a speed· advantage over all U. S. vessel s is still incapable
of following Polaris~2
The U.S.S.R. is defended against bomber attack by several
thousand interceptors and 12,000 SAM ' missiles~3 these being controlled from over 5000· early warning and ground control radar
si tes~4

Yet this system, which is ·the most massive the vlOrld

has ever se en, does not promise to achieve , a high degree of success.
Large over-the-horizon radars are being c' onstructed~5 new aircraft
wi th updated electroni,cs and ordinance are being

deployed~6 as

are mobile SAMs with a minimum effective altitude of'150 , feet
against fast aircraft~7 but this is simply not enough.
Union retains

r~ajor

The Soviet

wea-messes in, low-al ti tude defense bombers

such as the B-1 which is chock full of ECM (electronic counter
measures) that has gon~.nmatched.

The technology needed to

develop the necessary radar such as AWACS is unavailable which
means that Russia will be equally vulnerable to cruise missiles
and SRM~s.68 It has been suggested that when and if the United
States eliminates manned bombers and cruise missiles, the Soviets
will convert their ineffective SAM, sites t o more effective ABI'II
systems in violation of the SALT treaty .

Again due to techno-

logical constraints, it is very unlikely that this will
Although absolutely

n~oody

occur~9

of proof exists to substantiate
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the claim, the best Soviet method of damage-limitation is probably their civil defense system.

They spend $1 billion per year

on this and at least in the public literature, they are confident
that it will succeed in protecting enough of. the government
structure and people to run: it against any attack!O

Besides a

vast network of public shelters, the civil defense prograIh ·gives
special inducements to servicemen to settle in remote areas!l
And between 1966 and 1970, the government located

60ia

industry in cities or less than 100,000 people!2

Perhaps the

of new

civil defense system more than any otherweapon or doctrine indicates the seriousness with which the Russia.11.s treat the possibility
of a nuclear holocost • .

The tremendous

bu~up

of Soviet forces, both offensive and

defensive, has led many observers to believe that the
are seeking to attain a first-strike capability.

Co~~unists

Indeed, the

statistics are impressive; in 1974 alone, $103 billion was spent
7~

on nuclear weapons;- and each year, over one-third of the nations
resources are consumed by the military!4

According to Paul Nitze,

the Soviets have bought themselves enough strength so that: 75
(b)y 1977, after a Soviet-initiated counter-force strike
against the U.S. to Which the U.S. responded with a counterforce strike, the Soviet Union would have remaining forces
sufficient to destroy Chinese and European NATO nuclear
capability, attack U.S. population and conventional military
targets, and still have a remaining force throw-weight in
excess of that of the United States.
This opl.nl.on is echoed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in his 1977
Report!6
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All in all, those who claim that the U. S. S. R. is seeking to
surpass and eventually destroy the United States forget that the
forrn.er nation will use force only in

extrem~

no alternative arid with little risk!7

circumstances with

Each superpower V'rill con-

tinue to be deterred from attacking the other because the risks
of destroying oneself along with ones opponent can never be ade ...
quately deduced.

Therefore , it is necessary to look else where for

the. raison d' etre of the Russian armaments program .
Some of the reasons have alreaq,r been elaborated-to be able
to defend the Soviet Union and defeat any opponent who attacks ,
to maintain parity with the United States with ' its superior tech-,
nology and so forth.

The Russians has hoped that increased . mili--

tary strength would give them more power in Europe;8 an effect
which is not particularly evident.

Clearly however, the U.S.

was humbled into giving them more diplomatic maneuverability!9
Ultimately, one must remember that the Soviets have
ceptual limits on weapons deployment~O

~o

con-

The proof of their be-

lieving that "more equals better" is amply demonstrated by observing that after World War II, they pla!1.Jled to build 1200 submarines , and in fact were turning out 80 per year until Khrushchev
saw the light~l
At the 1974 SUIIunit, a top Soviet officer stated that his
nation's ICBMs had a CEP of t mile, and not t mile as was usually
. th e T",tes t 82
This would fulfill the "worst-case" theories
assumea~ ln
•
of Pentagon stra.tegists and enable the Russians to destroy most ,
but not all , of our fixed, land-based missiles .

Nonetheless , I

.

I
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stress that beyond a shadow of a doubt, the bomber and SLBlVI thirds
of the U.S. Triad, as well as the surviving missiles, will constitute sufficient

risk~

as defined by the Soviets in their stra-

tegic doctrine, to deter them from launching a first-strike,
assuming of course that they harbor such an intention at all.

To conclude , I reiterate what every major piece of Soviet
military literature bluntly states: a strong nuclear posture is
necessary to defend the homeland from hostile foes who_ wish to
destroy her if

possible~3

They believe that atomic weapons are

central- to all phases of its militarwower84 and that because of
the great destructive power of new conventional explosives, the
8'transition to " nukes" -V 'lill be fa;irly easy.::> The chance that their
use will be called for is remote but in the hostile environment
which surrounds a socialist state, maximum preparedness is mandatory.
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WAR AND THE SITUATION IN EUROPE

Across a broad frontier in Central Europe, the United State s
and the Soviet Union face each other with a vast array of military
equipment that includes thousands of tactical nuclear weapons(TNW).
The situation is tense, with both supowers regarding their opponents as hostile and inclined to attack .
These circumstances , ' involving two great nations poised a t
each others throats, but on foreign soil , are precisely those
which could most easily foster a nuclear conflict between the
U.S. aIld Russia.

Somehow, the use of atomic weapons which are

significantly less powerful than those contained in missile warheads, a nd which are not directly destined to annihilate ones
own citizens, have been easier to justify.

Basically, the theorists

have reasone d that even if the nuclear threshold is crossed at
the tactical level , escalation of hostilities · to all-out strategic
exchanges

between~ ·;the

combatants , or the s o-called "unthinkabl e " t .

will continue to be deterred.
This type of thinking is dubiously optimistic , and in the
present chapter I hope to show that not only do

unkno~'m

variables

deter &'1l.erica and the U. S. S.R. from using any kind of nuclear
device, but that no military alteration of the .E!uropean status
quo can reasonably be expected.

The disc'u ssion will center first

on the capabilities , strategies and perceptions of and in theatre
nuclear warfare of the two sides and them move on to the likelihood of a Soviet attack and the problems of constructing an ade-
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quate NAT O defense

pbsture ~

The Soviet Uni on is fully capable of launching a massive
battlefield nuclear offensive in Europe~

Besides the well-known

mechanized armies , she has 3500 tactical nukes which does not
includ e the several htmdred I'IIRBMs that are based in Russian terr-

itory~

TheseVleapons have large yields and poor accuracy and are

mostly deployed atop small surfac~o-surface ~issiles~
In the event that a war breaks out between NATO and the
'v'larsaw Pact , it is probable that the Soviet tactical nuclear
arsenal will be utlilized.

Although the Russians no longer be-

lieve in the inevitability of a European war becoming nuclear ,
they do consider. such ,escalation is highly likely1 and thus,
in the. word s of Donald Rumsfeld;
(t)heirTNFs (tactical nuclear forces) appear to remain an
integral part of their warfighting capabilities.
American analyist s have vITitten of the Soviet military posture as indicating .a strong first-strike potential against NATO
force s , however, Communist literature as serts that if will be
the We stern alliance which initially crosses the nuclear threshold?
A.A. Sidorenko, in his book The Offensive, states that NATO . will
re.l y on "massed employment of nuclear weapons"; and that rather
than accept defeat , it will escalate· during , the most critical
situations .

In the event that we do use tactical nuke s , the

Soviets feel that they will be forced to do

likewise~

Regardless of rvhich sid e begins a war in Europ e , it can be

(7 3 )

assumed that , at least for the Russians , nuclear vveapons will
play an important role in the subsequent fighting.

According

t o Sokolovskiy's Soviet Military Strategy, the military "bible" ,
tactical nuclear weapons give better results than conventional
means of destruction and can be used to solve problems of every
scale~ Says Sidorenko: lO
••• nuclear weapons will become the chief means of defeating
the enemy • ••
And Goure, Kohler, and Harvey add that ll
••• Soviet military theory, doctrine, strategy, war planning,
force structure and organization, instruction and training
programs, battle exerCises, resource allocations, research
and development programs and activities, civil defense efforts',
indoctrination programs for the troops and for the populatiOn,
war readiness measures, and so on are all keyed to and dominated by the nuclear weapons factor.
,

Although the Soviets are probably sincere in their belief
that NATO v'dll inaugerate nuclear attacks, it should be noted
that they realize the importance of a first strike to their

OV'ffi

cause and would like to be able to take the initiative in crOSSing
b "
, thr'es h 0 Id ~"f th e Wes t ,eg~ns
a convent·~ona1 war.12'
t lle

Given the

superior NATO mobilization resources, the Russians are well aware
that they can not engage in protracted hostilities.

In the Far

East, where the Red Army i~imilarly incapable of waging a war
of attrition with the Chinese, Moscow has rnaae it clear that it
will launch a nuclear first-strike , a policy which may also apply
to Europe~3
The U.. S . S. R. has never said that it would restrict the use,
'
t Wl"th a rnlnlmlrn
"""
of force to take the Con t lnen

0f

d amage,14 h owever'
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most American strategists have assumed that preserving a solid
economic base on which to rebuild is a top Soviet priority~5
means that they

wo~ld

This

have to launch a pre-emptive attack and 'Nipe

out all NATO forces so that we vvould have nothing to withhold for
a deferred strike.

The l ocation of every single . American tactical

nuke is 'Nell known to both sides and therefore a successful first
strike is a theoretical posSibility~6
Further support for the assumption that the Soviet Union will
not hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe comes from
the fact that they believe such devices raise troop morale and
correspond:irgly lowers it for the enemy~7

Sidorenko has said that

the side with the highest morale will win;8 something which speaks
for the sustenance of V. S. resolve as a re.quirement for stability.

Alain Enthoven expresses the feelings of the American government when he states that 19
(a) free anc}1.ndependent Wester.a Europe , aligned with the .
United States, is vital for our national security and wellbeing.
Al though our actual force levels assigned to NATO are bou...11.d to
rise and fall with the mood of Congress , the U.S. commitment to
safeguarding the nations of Western Europe is unlikely to diminish.
Thus, even though American lives would have to be sacrificed to
insure t he survival of Frenchmen or Germans , our armed presence
aimed at deterring the Warsaw Pact must

b~

.taken seriously.

The 7000 tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe , worth
some $2 billion~O serve three military functions-linking NATO

( 75 )

defenses to the U.S. strategic deterrent, preventing Soviet use
of such weapons, and providing for a SOQ~d defense against a Pact
all-out conventional attack~l

As I have already mentioned, the

first function would not work if put to the test , however its
very nature insures enough uncertainty in Russian minds to preclude their probing the link~2

The second function plays on · the

fear that any nuclear exchange will escalate to an all-out strat egic encounter, and the third represents the American belief
that we

shou~d

trade off between Communist hordes and our tech-

nology~3
Just how NATO will use tactical nuclear weapons is not clear.
Stanley Hoffman told a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee that
no doctrine had even geen· developed~4 but a less pessimistic
'ofl olfgang Heisenberg, in an Adelphi Paper , has wri t 'ten that 25
•• • the present theatre nuclear forces are the product far
more of pragmatic considerations within the military bureaucracies than of an agreed" coherent strategic doctrine.
In the short run, this indecisiveness will add considerable risk
to any Soviet armed initiatives because the Pact will have to
fear a NATO pushing of the panic button that could bring on a
holocost, rather than our cooly putting thought-out· contingency
plans into operation.

However if deterrence fails, the dangers

of a doctrinal void become obvious-lacking confidence, we might
not use tactical nukes at all and lose the war, or, we might go
to the opposite extreme and destroy Europe and maybe ourselves
by using them all .
Having no doctrine to speak of should not be confused with
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one that is outwardly ambiguous as to how it will be implemented.
General BrOMl of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says that 26
NAT O will deliberately escalate to whatever extent is necessary to turn back aggressiofi.
This conspicuous lack of particulars prevent-s the Russic=ns f rom
evaluating the risks of an attack on Western Europe and thus is
beneficial, however it is mandatory for NATO comrriB-nders to have
secretly worked out prudent reactions to every possible scenario .
Heisenberg has speculated that the United States will use
TNW on a scale that exceeds a mere demonstration of resolve and
that is less than a full-scale military effort.

Initial attacks ,

against military targets, would hopefull delay th~nemy offensive
and signal a willingness to escalate if necessary~7 .There is no
doubt that the U.S., · as in the strategic arena, has a supreme '
interest in damage-limitation, a policy which makes

s~nse

for we

have realized that, unlike Vietnam, we can not save Europe by
destroying it~8

With this objective in mind, we have deployed

thousands of so-called "mini-nukes" which have a blast effect
only a fraction that of the Hiroshima bomb.

In addition, NATO

has de-activated earlier delivery systems that were either inaccurate or of too high a yield.

This policy of damage . . . limitation

has gone so far that most American tactical nuclear bombs can no w
be instantly adjusted by the flick of a switch to low or high
blast power~9

As is evident from the previous

~iscussion,

both superpowers
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are heavily armed and claiming that they will not hesitate to
use nuclear weapons to defend their European interests .

Never-

theless, if one peels away the nationalistic rhetoric which spews
forth freely from all parties concerned, the bare set of £acts
that i s revealed point s to the conclusion that these arsenals
will remain undisturbed.
In setting forth the reasons for the above statement; I do
not wish the arguments to become one-sided in the sense of there·
being solely a "Russia as the potential aggressor" perspective .
We must keep in mind that the Soviet Union believes the u.S.
will b e the likely initiator of hostilities, nuclear or conven- .
tional ~O ~'1.d that, we have no right to demand the Communists
interpret our military preparations as ruling our an attack~l
Getting to the heart of the problem, one sees that the Soviet s
could have only two possible reasons for attacking Western Europe .
These are: to establish an economic and social base for t,he future
development of socialism or the U.S . S.R. itself, and to gain some
other advantage that would still outweigh the costs of a general
nuclear war that might very well ensue~2

The attack would take

one of the following forms: an all-out conventional attack, an
all-out tactical nuclear attack, a limited conventional attack
in pursuit of more limited objectives than establishing Soviet
hegemony over the whol e continent, an al.I-out conventional attack
supporte by selected u se of atomic weapons, and an all-out attack
occuring 'simultaneously with a massive strategic offensive against
the United State s of America .
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The premise that the

U.~LS. R.

viill attack Western Europe to

gain new political and economic strength does not wash in light
of the fact (which I rvill subsequently elaborate on) that a total
military conquest is not po s sible.

And of course an attack mc-

tivated by the hop es of benefits outweighing the risks of damage
to the Soviet homeland has already been dismissed in an earlier
chapter as being against common sense and rJarxist theory.

E~en

in the political arena, there are constraints which prevent the
U•.S.S.R. from waging a Y'rar in Europe.
westward would run

For one thing, an attack

the risk of uniting Germany and the Soviet s

cringe at the thought~3

They are equally afraid of agitating

the West for fear that the Chinese, sensing a diversion, will
attack in the East and,. possibly embroil the country in a twofront war.

Finally, it just may be that the Soviets

want a neutral Europe

~~d

ulti~ately

one which is free of a u. S. military

. t a.OIDlna
~
. t lon.
. 34
presence " b u t no t necessarl. 1 y un d er Cormnunls
In dealingvvith the military alternative s open to the Soviet s
should they vvish to alter the European status quo , it can be seen
that a

n~mber

of s ound reason can b e presented to show the infeasi-

bility of each.
An all-out conventional war would not cause excessive damage 35
s o a full blovm Warwaw Pact attack, sans nuclear weapons , seems
the logical method of action.
seek a

li ~htning-quick

But we must · remember that they

defeat of NATO forces so as to avoid a

vvar of attrition, just as much as they seek to limit the destructio:'l.

With a purely conventional Soviet attack , these two . obje c-
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iV'e s c onflict because the West has it's hands on superior equipeI1t that \vill allow it to. defeat,

or at the least, stall any

rfensive not supporta:l by nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, because

four ambiguous policy statements, the Russians can not be absol-

'telY guaranteed that we will not resort to our tactical atomic
·rsenal.
~il1

This is also true for the French who have said that they

use nukes in response to any Soviet attack that threatened

36

.1er.

In 1974,

Pa1)~

Warnke told a Senate subcommittee that a limited

lact attack to achieve limited objectives was more likely than
amassive conventional attack~7 however the deterrence factors
~entioned

here.

in the previous paragraph still seem to be operative

I:e;the Soviets launch a surprise offensive and then Call a

quick cease-fire before . we can respond, they involve themselves
in a number of serious . problems that would certainly outweigh tb.e
~ains

in capturing a few key industrial centers or military outposts.

For example, the United States might no longer be willing to
honor its unwritten agreement to keep our of the affairs of Eas-

tern Europe.

And of course, I have already mentioned the threat

posed by China if the attentions of the Soviets are diverted.
A third possible Russian method of attack is the unrestrained
Use of tactical nuclear weapons in support . of massive penetrations
by mechanized ground forces.

Assuming that they had decided to

forego any attempts at damage-limitation, this vvould be the pre~

~erred

opt ion to be employed immediately

aft~r

a NATO-inaugerat .e d

armed conflict, or for a surprise pre-emptive strike .
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The problems associated with an all-out nuclear attack on
Europe are numerous .

Because the U.S. is superior in overall

tactical nuclear capability1 8 virtually our entire force structure
will have to be destroyed at the outset to prevent us from effectively striking back.

Given the alert status of various NATO

defenses and a host of otheJ7factors, this can not be reasonably

expected~9

Even if an all-out offensive attains success , Jeffrey
Record of the Brookings Institute has stated that 40
... a pre-emptive Soviet nuclear strike of the magnitude

necessary to deprive NATO's forward-deployed air forces of
an effective tactical nuclear seuond-strike capacity would
run an extremely grave risk of sparking a major nuclear
conflict perhaps involving the · use of strategic vveapons by
- the United States.
Finally, if vve assume the Russians accept the risk of crossing
the nuclear threshold , and then assume that they destroy all our
European forces, the United States can still ca.ll up reinforcements .
These could either be naval forces operating from the Atlantic
and Mediterranean, tactical aircraft operating from remaining
bases in Europe and Bri tian. , or even Strategic Air Comrn,a..Yld bombers
flying round-trips from the United -States .
The fourth form of attack, one which VIas primarily conventional but which employed limited nuclear strikes, combines the
drawbacks of both.

Inherent in this type of attack is the · risk

of escalation, the possibility of an extended war involving
selected atomic strikes by both sides , and the sparing of a
certain nl.unber of American bases and aircraft which will eventually
be brought into play .

This obviously makes no sense militarily
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and there · is no evidence that the Russians have c.ontemplated such
a strategy.
The final possible scenario , involving simultaneous fullscale attacks on the United States a...'l'J.d Europe , can be easily
discounted in light of the reasons for the maintainence of deterrence which have been discussed throughout this

p~.per.

Con--

ceivably , if through some fantastic set of circu.rIlstances, the
U. S. S.R. achieves the ability to destroy the vast majority of
American strategic and tactical nuclear forces in a pre-emptive
strike vlhile limiting damage to herself, she could implement a
worldwide plan of this kind, however, this is currently too fantastic to seriously consider.

In the near future, the Warsaw Pact is not going to attack
NAT O and conversely , NATO will stay away from a military engagement
with the Warsaw Pact. , Yet a tactical nuclear war ' remains a possibility because of unforeseeable accidents and thus it is necessary for the United States to further policies of deterrence
through a sound war-fighting capability and the veiled tl'l..reat
linking the use of tactical nukes on behalf of Europe ' s defense
to our strategic forces .
In all probability the accidenta.l firing of a nuclear-tipped
missile or the straying of aircraft over crucial enemy positions
or .confusion-ridden border skirmishes will not l ead us dO"J'mthe
ro.ad to Vlar.

Communication links .betvveen Moscow and Washington

will activated, cool heads will prevail , and the immediate crisis
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will be alleviated .

How~ve~ ,

no one really knows 'this will happen, ·

especially if the nuclear threshold is accidentally crossed , and
therefore it will be necessary for the United States to retain a
strong defense posture in case the Soviets somehow feel

th~eatened

enough to become aggressive .
A complete spelling out of the hardware needed to enable us
to adequately defend Western Europe against any kind of Pact
attack

wou~d

this paper.

be extremely lengthy and not entirely germaine to
Therefore, I wish to expound only the guiding prin-

ciples which help to formulate the overall strategies and that
eventually dictate equipment needs .
The current debate about American involvement in NATO's
defense of Western Europe is split down the middle between those
who believe we have the capacity to meet a Soviet conventional
attack using only conventional forces of our ovm1 l and those who
believe our posture is somehow deficient~2

In general, t~e former

group presents more cogent arguments. however the pessimists have
succeeded in bringing to light a num.ber of deficiencies in NATO
doctrine and war-fighting capabilities that stand tobe corrected .
There is some evidence that points to a dangerous vulnerability
of our tactical nuclear forces to early capture and pre-emptive
strikes7 3

Only one example of this is the Atomic Demolition

IiIuni tions (ADM), nuclear devices exploded in forward areas to
slow or che.nnel an enemies advance.

ADM, to be buried in the

ground and then detonated by remote control to form an " instant
IiIaginot Line ", make no sense because not only will they have to
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be used on Allied soil, their explosion will be mandatory to
avoid their falling into Sovi-e t hands~4
Two general problems are raised by this example .

First ,

realizing that vulnerability is destabilizing in a crisis because
it invites pre-emptive attacks and thus also _puts a premium on
premature use , we must ascertain the necessary force structure
corrections .

And secondly, we must ask the inter-related question :

What should \ve do to keep tactical nukes under the strictest
controls and out of situations where we are deprived of any
options to use conventional forces?
most military

st~ategints

have persuasively argued that

NATO could best deter or defeat an attack on Western Europe . by a
combination of strong 'conventional war-fighting strength backed
up by invulnerable tactical nuclear forces.

The United States

is now adding planes and men to Central Europe as well as building
hundreds -o f aircraft shelters in an attempt to beef up our nonnuclear capabilities~5 however it seems that more fundarnental
revisions are in order •
. vVol fgang Heisenberg has proposed some interesting restructuring plans in a recent study for the Internatio:rEJ;tnstitute for
Strategic Studies based in London~6

After disproving the oft-

held theory that Tl'rN, and not modern conventional armaments could
offset Soviet superiority in numbers of

ta~~s,

manpower, and so

on~7 he sets forth a Crisis Stability Model for the ideal European
defense.

This would involve the removal of most tactical nuclear

weapons from the Continent once an adequate conventional posture
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had been achieved .

A few land-'based missiles would remain in

areas removed from the front line of defense hOv'lever these
be supported by several hundred Poseidon-launched MIRVs
at

Europe~8

wou~d

aime d

Alain Enthoven has supported this in his own writings ,

claiming that we have an excess of such warheads, they having
originally been developed to overcome the Soviet ABM system~9
Heisenberg admits that his Crisis Stability Model does involve
slight

war-~ighting

limitations however he claims that this would

not be sig-!1ificant if a strategy of escalation was followed?O
By this he means that , we '~ will deployl TNW as a means of restoring
deterrence; this would be in keepil1..g: with a pi.icy of 'what Ben...;
jamin Lambeth calls 51
•• . maximizing the adversary ' s fear that , in seeking limited
objectives at his opponents expense, he might subject himself to u~timate losses from massive retaliation or uncon'7~:- ~'=- ~.:trolled crisis escalation, either of whose consequences
wo uld be out of all proportion to the original values sought .
While I have prevlou8·ly said that using nuclear weapons to restore .
deterrence is to be avoided, Heisenberg ' s suggestions play on the
uncertainty of a link between the defense of Europe and U. S.
strategic nuJcesand therefore do more for deterrence than they
do to hurt our military posture in the event of a failure by our
conventional forees .
To be sure , the Crisis Stability Model ha$ it t s disadvantages.
On one hand , there is the problem of communicating vYith submarines
i'lhich I have already discussed 52 in detail else 1flhere . And on the
other hand, the Russians v{ould have no vlay of knowing if the SLBMs
were tactical or strategic?3

These differences however assume
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s ome highly unlikely contingencies .

A Pact. effort of the nece-

ssary intensity to disrupt submarine communications with landbased command centers Vlould be one which could greatly enhance
the chanc es of' escalation.

As for the second drawback of the .

Crisis Stability Model, this expects us to imagine a situation
where both the conventional forces and the land .... based missiles
had somehow failed, probably from a pre-emptive strike.

Given

these circumstances, the Soviets would proahably have made very
substantial advance s in Europe and thus would be willing to declare
a cease-fire to protect their "gains as .well as the safety of the
U.S.S.R. itself .

As for the problem . of identi.f ying a missile as

tactical or strategic, the use of depressed-trajectory SLBMs
might alleviate any confusion.
If we theorize even further and envision a situation where
the use of tactical nucl ear weapons did not cause the ·Soviets to
relent ; then it would b e apparant · that they had called our bluff
on the link between TNW and U.S. strategic forces.
ve

In this event ,

would have to acc.ept our losses and give up Europe.

Of course ,.

this reasoning borders on the absurd and I bring up thi s

partic~

ular scenario only to)press home the point that the Cri sis Stability
Model proposed by Heisenberg neither guarantee s a NATO military
victory nor commits us to a general nuclear war .
I now turn to the se cond . major problem facing NATO today:
What should we do to keep tactical nukes under the strictest
control s and out of situations where we aredeprieved of any
options t o use conventional forces?

Before beginning the dis-

......
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cussion , I remind the reader that my underlying
that

~~y

assu~p t ion

is

war in Europe will come about accidentally.

Of the 7000 tactical nukes currently stockpiled under the
jurisdiction of the United States for NATO use, many are artillary
shells and small fuobile missiles destined for distribution t o
scattered ground forces when a war breaks out .
these arm&-n ents being sent out the the

fiel~,

The prospec t of
though they could

theoretically be needed for defense , is an extremely dangerous
one because in conditions of heated pattIe , it is more than likely
that low-level CTh."111Il~ders will authorize their use~4

Such a

lowering of the nuclear threshold., which goes beyond a.Il0'"" semblence
of Presid,ential control , speaks forcefully for a reduction of the
number of nu.lces deployed in Europe as well as against the building
of so-called "mini-nukes" .
The traditional" reasons for the deployment of so m8-YlY small
nuclear v'feapons have all been discounte d.
'Communist hordes traded for
already

~een

Americ~""1

The fallacy of the

technology" theory has

put aside in these pages and the other widely used

argument that TNVo{ saves money, is also untrue.

British, German,

and U.S. studies have shown that for a variety of reasons , conventional weapons are far more cost-effective and actually require
the support of fe'v'ler troops.55 If 6000 of these tactical nukes
are removed , a figure which has been widely used, not only will
l;ve save $321 million per year~6 we will increase our security by
insuring that no low-level cOImnander can order the breaking of
the nuclear threshold if he thinks the fighting is going against

', .
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him.
The shoring up of our battlefield capabilities after the
removal of the TNW can easily be accomplished through the deployment of a new generation of smart weapons , namely, laser and t elvision guided bombs.

This hardware, because of · its accuracy,

falls within the same price range as unguided weapons, and a
substantial arsenal, which is currently beyond the technological
reach of the Soviet Union, should give us a war-winning capability
without resort to TNW.

Additional developments such as a tank

wi th armor that will withstand any knovm anti-tank gun or missile,
due to enter service in 1980, reinforces this belief~7
The new precision-guided munitions are so efficient, that
if they were to be equipped with large conventional warheads,
they could probably have the same military impact
The~e

asmini~nukes .

mini-nukes, which have already be.en partially incorporated

into the NATO forces, are sub-kiloton devices with1.ow yield and
low radiotion effect~8

The rationale for these weapons has been

that they will be unlikely to spark an escalation of hostilities ,
however, whether large or small tactical nukes are used, they .<. -.
still constitute a firebreak~9

Furthermore, not only do mini-

nukes l)lur the very distinct boundary between atomic and conventional ordinance, an undue reliance upon the former in our war•. fighting. pos·ture could easily lead us to use them prematurely
vihen the lat t er could still suffice to turn back aggression?O
Perhaps the best argument against a dependence on tactical
nuclear weapons is the unsureness that we can bring ourselves
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to'.use t h em.

Given the close proximity of many military instal-

lations to large cities , up to 100 million cou~d be killed in a
limited tactical nuclear war.61 Even a I1 successf1J~" defense of
Europe would not be 'North such a cost.

The basic factor on our

minds ho\vever is the undiscountable fear that there will be no
stopping point between a limited and all-out war?2

Not only does

no one know how to fight a tactical nuclear war~3 a variety of
Presidential inhibitions could prevent him from pushing the but-.
ton • . Philip Dyer has studied this problem and pronounced that
tactical nukes will never be used hecause their will never be
enough support from the public or sufficient troop jeapardy" to
warrant a gample that could coneeivably destroy the two strongest
civilizations on earth?4

On the former point , he is supported

by a 1969 Time-LouJ.s Harris Poll which showed that only
the American people

w01J~d

17~~

of

use nukes in the defense of Canada and

an even s::naller 8% . would risk~it for We st Germany?5

Citing a

tendency for the President to make minimal decisions that will
stir up the least antagonism Dyer claims that resisting by

con-

v-entional means will be the only possible consensual decision.
He concludes by asking the following question. Compared to what
use of force would the use of tactical nuclear· weapons be the
l ess fearful alternative?66
As former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard puts
it: 67
With the uresent nuclear balance the United States wou.ld
not use its nuclear forces against the Soviet Union short
of a dire threat to the survival of the United States.
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NEW TECHNOLOGTES .AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

In the atomic age , advanced technology has often had a
negligible influence on the overall nuclear balance between the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

While

the l atter has continually conceededscientific superiority to
the West , she has still managed to effectively translate lesser
and even archaic equipment into an adequate deterrent force .

In

fact , it would take an extaordinary technological advantage by
one side to give it a chance at emerging victorious from a strategic
exchange .
Why them is it essential for any discussion of p:ossible
future Soviet-American nuclear rellationships to examine the
scientific products. of tomorrow?

For one thing, defense planners

are constantly coming up with worst-case analyses that predict
major technological breakthroughs of enough significance so as
to convince the enemy that he can launch an assured destruction
attack \",hile limiting

d~age

to

himsE~lf.

And secondly, new de-

velopments in weapons systems could have a drastic effect on
crisis stability, either

beca~se o~ulnerability

appear t o signal first-strike intentions.

or because they

I wish only to present

an overvies of impending technology as it relates to the two
factors stated above.
At present, both superpowers do not foresee any ma j or technological breakthroughs that will upset the strategic balance to
an appreciable extent~

Although no information on Soviet per-

( 93 )

ceptions is available , krnerican scientists have concluded that
there 'will be no new revolutionary discoveries in rs.dar jarnming~
nuclear wee.pons teCh.:."1ology~ or anti-submarine warfare~

It is

perhaps this last belief, that there will be no way to simultaneously destroy an entire SSBN force, which most reassures the
continuation of deterrence.
As for the great ICBM accuracy race that has been waged
with vigor for the past fifteen years , we are nearing the end
of the line where, in another fifteen years, Nature will_step in
and declare a ·truce .

There is simply a physical limit to CEP

improvement, the accepted figure being .30 feet without som.e sort
of terminal guidance:
In . the last few years, much has been said about the potential
revolutionizing effects of lasers on the science of warfare , and
indeed , both the United States and the Soviet Union have underteken extensive laser programs , however at the present time, no
solid predictions can be made?

The speculate~ military nossibil-

ities of these devices run the gamut of war-fighting as we now
know it and at some future date, one can not discount the chance
that a nation might construct an impregnable defense.

Any real

fears though, are premature because difficul t ies relating to
wieldiness , practicality, and cost now appear to be insurmountable!

The Soviets believe that an adequate defense must be kept up
to date wi thfu...YldaInentally new weapons, even, as has already been
mentioned , if these weapons appear destabilizing to the other

side~

Thus it follows that the Russians have attached great imnortance
to technology, and particularly to achieving parity with the
Westr

At present,they greatly lag in this vital

ar~ a ,

a fact

which was demonstrated. when the Israelis evaluated their latest
equipment captured from the Egyptians and discovered that tube s ,
and not transistors were being utilized~

However, on the horizon,

the Soviets have a number of defense programs that will either
equal or exceed U.S. capabilities.
The continual Russian interest in modern ICBMs has paid
off handsomely in the last few years but a number of further
advances are still to be expected as the results of their ambi tious MIRV program become available.

A fiul tipl e warhe8.d system

for the SS-N~8 SLBM will be deployed before the end of the decade lO
as will a similarly configured mobil~ IRBM~l

Looking ahead to the 1980's, we can expect the Soviet s to
introduce follow-up ICBms to supplant or even replace tho se introduced in 1914 . and 1915~ 2

These missiles will have a CEP of one-

tenth mile and be able to deliver several one-megaton warhead s
or 25-fifty kiloton warheads, giving them a 95% kill probability
against 3500 psi silos~3

The total number of land and sea-based

MIRVs will be approximately 1,000~4 a force sufficient in size
and effectiveness to jeapardize the. American fixed ICB!!1 deterrent.
'.rhe implic a tions of this vvill be reviewed in the concluding chap-ter.
Other notable scientific endeavors that have been discus.s ed
or tested by the Soviets include device s to neutralize U.S. mili-

tary spacecraft yvhilein orbi t;-5 satellite s able to destroy ICBMs,
and a missile protection system which operates by discharging
high speed asphc::d t particles above silos~6

These first two progra"Ils,

if made operational, cotud be successfully countered by saturation
and the third has been declared infeasible by American 2..'1.alyists .

The project Americans are

ba~king

on for the future is a

fourth dimension to the Triad: a projectile called a cruise missile which uses aerodynamic lift and propulsion and for the most
part, remains within the earth' s atmosphere~~

The cruise misiile,

which has already been flo'vvn in an air-launched version (ALC~,n;-8
can be deployed from naval vessels, submerged submarines, mobile
ground launchers, and aircraft~9

It . is subsonic, capabl e of long-

range, relatively chea:p, extremely accurate , and virtually invulnerable to radar detection because of its tiny cross-section
OOl
and . low o~era tlng
cel_lng.20 These are outstanding credentials
0

to be sure, however the cruise missile has sparked a debate which
has involved the Armed Forces and Congress as Ylell as the entire
negotiating position of the United States at SALT talks.
,Proponants of the cruise missile have stressed the aforementioned qualities of the weapon- as reason enough for its incorporation into the'United States deterrent force .

They add

that defending against it, after it has been launched from a
plane flying outside Soviet terri tory and carrying as ma...'1Y as

100~1 would be a tremendous eXtJense~2

Finally, those who support

the cruise missile say that it will raise the nuclear threshold

·
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by virtue of the fact that given it s potential accuracy, it can
replac e tactical and even strategic atomic warheads with conventional one s ~3

For exw~ple, a terminally-guided non-nucl ear ALCM

could, with a penetrator warhead , att'ack herdened silos and cOIIlInand

posts~4
Opponents of these weapons cite various other projects such
as the B-70 and the YF-12A which similarly were outstanding pieces
of military equipment but which simply did not provide enough of
an increment over forces already in existance .

In short, it i .s

claimed that the cruise missile will be susceptible to manned
interceptors and SAl'JI s ,. that it has unnecessarily complicated
the SALT talks, and that it will not raise the nuclear threshold~5
On this last point, doubt is cast upon the belief that the substitution of large nukes by small nukes or even convehtional explosives will set limit s on the scope of the conflict ·because
the Russians ' will hav,e no idea as to , the nature of the warheads
coming . at them.
The United State s now has a 6 to 8 year lead in cruise missil e teChnology26 hovvever our first models are not likely to be
deployed before the mid-1980 I s~7

The effect of such deployment

\vill be discussed along with the impact of new Russian ICBMs in
the next chapter.

I should not here that advocates and opponents

of the cruise missile agree that international restrictions will
be

im~ossible,

both for tactical and strategic modes b ecause

range, payload , and

nTh~bers could not be monitered~8

The director of the Dep a rtment of Defens e Advanced Research Pro-

"

' ';'':

. :'
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j ects Agency has recently reported to Congress that he 29
cannot recall a period in the past decade 'l'vhen so many tech- nological breakthrough$ with potential major impact on
national security were on the horizon.
George Heilmeier cited the examples of lasers , new types of geosynchronous satellites to detect aircraft as well as missiles ,
ne w InCL11.ufacturing tech..1'1iques for making jet engines, and others
out h_e did not elaborate on exactly what impact they

wou~d

have .

It is likely that he overstated his case however the United
States does have .nllinerous promising projects in the works that
are worth running

do~m.

Self-Initiated At.t ack Mi.sqi.le( SIAM )-A missile which could be prepositioned and then · left unattended, launching itself vvhen it
detected an appropriat'ed enemy aircraft .

riIost major componants

are already being produced for other weapons~O
688-class Nuclear Ai;tack

Submarine-Alre~tdy

funded by Congress to

be purchased at the rate of five ,e veriJ two years.

Will be the

world's fastest submarine with Russian SSBNs as likely targets~l
Extremely Lo';'1 FreO'L).ency (ELF) Communications Progr8..L"Il.,..A communications network devised to enable us to transmit data to deeply
submerged subramines .

Will be vulnerable so its contributions

to Am,erican security will proably only last through the first
stages of a war.

ELF will be complimented by 14

el~ctronics

filled EC-13Gs called Tacoma, however these aircraft will have
more limited capabilities~2
Sea-Based or Airborne Antiba:Lli .B.t ic Missile Interceptio.n. System
(SABTI1IS or ABIvlIS)- Former configuration would employ ships
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equipped with sophisticated radar and 6issiles close to an
adversaries coast .
t erminal phase .

ICBMs would be intercepted before their

ABIr'IIS r't'ould be more effective against SLBMs

and could also be used to defend other co. untries~J
Mul tiple . Lc.unch-Point System-It has been proposed that we spend
1.5 billion dollars per year for the next eight to ten years to
build thousands of hardened silos within which our ICBMs vlOuld
be randomly deploye d.

If the Russians al so decided to build one ,

or if they opted to place more de.p endence on their SLBMs, they
would

have to sacrifice much of their current throw-v'leight ad..,.

vantage~4
Attack Assessment . System. (AAS)-Now being deveolped , A..4.Swill
give the President a minute report on theextent of nuclear da.mage
to the United States~5
Trident II-This advance SLBI:lI will take full advantage of the
Trident submarine's missil e launchers and v."ill also be equipped
\-vi th a high accuracy ma..."l1.euvering re-entry vehicle (MARV) which
has already been successfully tested~6

The Trident system will

not be en§,angered by any expected Soviet ASW threat and will have
the ability to destroy hard-sited ICBrvIs~7

To enter the fleet in

1987~8
WIX-A completely new ICBThI vvhich will replace Minuteman beginning

in 1983~9

To be deployed from existing silos, in a mobile cafiguration, or perhaps in an air-dropped mode,40 the MX . .'li11 be
,41 A hard-target kiJ.l ca.p abili ty
MARVed and carry up to 14 war ~h eaa.s.
is assured by its terminal guidance as vvell as i ts ability to

utilize information on mid-course correction provided by a series
of 24 geosysnchronous s atellites, soon to be placed in orbit1 2
other projects being discussed or implemented include

improve~

ments to, the orbital warning system that will ma..1{e i t more reliable and less vulnerable to Soviet killer satellites~3 miniature
destroy-by-impact interceptors which neutralize enemy spacecraft~4
radar that is unaffected by cloud cover~5 and a B-52 modernization
refit that will extend its service life by fifteen years~6

In sum , it should be realized that many · of these ideas now
in the embryonic or drawing board stage will never actually materialize for reasons of cost , practicality, or possibly because
of treaty limitations.

However it is fair to say that the ever

increasing vulnerability of the fixed land-based missile will
force the United States and the Soviet Union to direct much of
their technological efforts towards producing new submarines
and ASW equipment.
As far as offensive developments are concerned , a big. push
is likely in the area of depressed-trajectory SLBMs, missiles
which, when fired close to shore , can give as little as five
minutes warning time~7

Existing systems lend themselve s to easy

to a low-trajectory mode however the utility of
such a move i s still open to question1 8 Without MARV, such SLBlVIs

modific~tion

would p·ose a distinct danger only to bombers, unhardened command
and control facilities, and coastal industrial centers, but nonetheless , Qualitative improvements could subsequently be made to
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produce a very credible first-strike threat .
Despi te the fact that ocean-wide ASV'l will remain elusive far
into the foreseeable future , the superpowers will naturally begin
to feel an increasing sense of vulnerability to the SSBNs as more
and more empasis is place on sea-based deterrent forces.

Suspicion,

however unwarranted , is an inevitable product · of the rivalry
be'tween the United States and the U.S . S.R. and it is only reasonable to expect a continuous arms race , focused on oceanic strategy
and propelled by sizable technological efforts .
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FUTURE

MAINTENM~CE

OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

By now, this paper should have made clear that strategic
arms are useful only for mutual deterrence.
Lambeth: 1

According to Benjamin

The United States and the Boviet Union have long since
reached a plateau in their strategic relationship. Until
mili tary technology can devise a tru~y effective 8..1'ld credible
means of neutralizing an adversary's deterrent force, the
persistance of residual second-strike capabilities in the
posession of each superpower, the continued uncertainty to
both regarding the probability of success a first strike
would have, and the continued unwillingness of either to
place its society's livelihood on the scale in an attempt
to find out, will all tend to preserve stabilitJ as a 'systemic' characteristic of the East-West nuclear balance.
Even"" if one side did manage to acquire a first-strike capability
in which it Vias highly confident, the prospect of an enemy launchon-warning would continue to further deterrence.
In the last twenty-five years, many military thinkers have
convinced, themselves that the intensity of the rivalry between
the Soviet Union and the United States will somehow override the
logic behind deterrence, leading us to a nuclear confrontation.
This notion must be totally dismissed and I again emphasize that
the hope of avoiding any use of atomic ".-"eapons and averting crises
which could lead to war is one which is fervently he.ld by both
sides and in fact, this hope is the predominate force behind
socialist and capitalist doctrine.•
Chances are, the passage of time will promote deterrence even
further.

With every passing day, the un'tYri tten ban against the

use of nuclear weapons gains real and symbolic strength, mruting
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the employment of these devices more unfamiliar, tentative , and

dangerous~

Questions about the length of

a

nuclear war , escalation,

and the efficacy of a first-s-G-rike become more and more formidable
as they continue unanswered.

u.s.

We can notcompleteiy deny that the

and the Soviet Union will ever enter into an armed conflict .

The fact is , nuclear weapons do exist and therefore they are
susceptible to being used by a mad...'D.an or by a panic-stricken
head of state who feels compelled to respond to either an accidental use by thE}'6ther . side or a deliberate use by a third party
allied with the other side.
Like . the military strategists , the· leadership

of

each super-

power has often been blinded to the real dictates of the strategic
balance .

That this has resulted from t he inevitable tension and

hostili ty

accompan~ling

the arms race is understandable however

the atmosphere is now condusive to change.

The next section

deals with the possibility of the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.tTanslating
their newly acquired comprehensions of t he nuclear weapon into
some. meaningful restraints on the technological treadmill .

The basic purposes of arms control negotiations are: to
l esson the likelihood of a nuclear war by providing for deterrence
at a lower level of armaments , to demonstrate to nations of the
world that national security is best protected by limitations
and restraint , to divert resources for domestic needs, and to
reduce insecurity andtensions~

~n addition, the dialogue itself

and the exchange of information is important to a mutual under-

standing of each negotiators position, even if no agreements are

reached~
That the Americans and the Russians want and need arms control is indisputable however the precise meaning of talks' between
the two has remained rather obscure.

The United States, with some

notable exceptions, has succumbed to the temptation to build
any weapons system that the scientists tell us.is possible, a
philosophy which stemmed from a fear that the Soviets would not
restra.in themsleves~ even if we did~
where 6

This has put us in a situation

we see systems that could have been ommitted, delayed, or
acquired in smaller quantities without endangering the
strategic balance; but we do not seem to lack systems we
nOv"l need.
Arms control talks negates this tendency to uninhibitedly purchase military equipment by providing for bilateral limitations.
The widespread disenchantment regarding American negotiations
with the Soviets does not come from the "if it can be made, it
will be made " school, but rather, fr'om those who feel we are
bargaining on a unilateral basis instead of a bilateral one .
The recent spirit of detente has 'resulted in obsdrvers coneluding that Russian participation in SALT is indicative of a
true slowing of the aTIns race , a genuine effort on the part of
the Kremlin for rapproachment with the ' We.st , and a host of other
things .

This has led to a constant dilemma in evaluating Soviet

.actions which are clearly not in lin,e with such hopeful reasoning .
For example , The New York Times , in reporting the annual parade
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held on the

anniversar~r

of the Socialist Revolution, stated that

u.S. intelligence officials had been unable to determine if the
absence of ICBMs in the largely military procession reflec t ed
Russian feelings of relaxed international tensions or a nlea by
Moscow' s mayor to spare the city's brittle cobblestones?
The Soviet Union does want both qualitative and quantitative
arms controls and they have said so in no uncertainterms~ often
asking for no l ess than a complete ban on nuclear devices~

Vfuat

prevents her objectives from seeing the light of day i s her belief , stemming from the Marxist doctrine, that the West is naturally hostile. and seeking to undermine socialist societi es .
other words, the Soviets regard all

bridge~building

In

as deliberate

capitalist provocations~O and therefore , as I have spelled out
in an earlier discussion of detente, they se"ek arms limitations
talks as a forum in which to gain an advantage over the enemy.
As the Russians view things, the U.S . wants a "peaceful dialogue
with them because of a combination of

Comm~~ist

strength and a

crisis in the NATO allifu"'1ce~l
Wi th this in mind, one might 1;vell ask if arms control can
serve as a viable means of stabilizing deterrence.

In answering

this que stion, it Vlould be most helpful if we began with a look
at what the SALT talks and other forms of East-West dialogue can
clearly not do.

Negotiations \'vill never put an end to the arms

race b ecause , for one thing, it is impossible to place limitat ionson research and development (R&D), and furthermore , neither
side can be comnelled to forgo a major weapons system that it
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feels it must have .

It can also be said that in no way will a

s eries of arms limitations promote detente, a fact evidenced by
Soviet military initiatives in Angola and their development of
Backfire and five nevv ICBms occuring simultaneously wi th SALT~ 2
Strangely enough, the negotiating process often has a negative affect on nuclear stability.

A nation

may~develop

systems solely for use as bargaining chips~3

new

New systems may

also be generated after comparisons of the rival force postures
produces unwarranted concern as to ones

vu~nerability.

Arms

negotiations also tend to place undue stress on improbable scenarios .like a first-strike instead of the more likely ones such
as accidents~4

Finally, these talks can often bog doy'm in less

than crucial details, 'something which

~etracts

from an understanding

of/;vhy one y;Jas motivated to bargain in the first place.
Is, then, arms control a necessity for both superp0V'iers?
The answer I believe is ' yes '.

A strong case is made by the past

agreements ratified by the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.-a banning of
nuclear weapons from the seabed(1971), a bal"'..ning of nuclear we apons from Antarctica( 1959 ), a banning of "nuclear weapOns from"
.

.

outer space, celestlal bodle s , ahd

It:;

the " moon(1967),~

the atmos-

pheric test-ban treaty(1963) , and a prohibition against placing
atomic devices in Latin America(1968)~6

These prove the feasi-

1;Jility of constructing arms restraints palatable to both sides.
Recently, skepticism about the utility of arms treaties for
the United States has been aired because of apparant Soviet violations of the SALT-I and Vladivostok agreements.

These abrogations ,
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made partially in response to Chinese military pressure , have
not been total and certainly not of sufficient magnitude to affect
the overall strategic balance~ 7 I 'vvould argtle that unless we enter
into a treaty that sustains the ver-:f essence of deterrence ,

some~

thing we should never do because it migh lessen stability, the
benefits of compliance would far outweigh the disadvantages of
partial· abrogation. The Soviet Union has traditionally honored
its agreements 18 and they have very strong reasons for wanting
to maintain an atmosphere in which they
the United States.

AssQ~ing

c~1'l

draw concessions from

that the Russians decide for some

reason to rna-lee treaties and then break them , the short term effect
will for the most part be fruitless because the United States would
have sufficient time to counter~9

The long term effects would

be equall;r counter-productive as the latter nation no longer would
feel inclined to enter ilito agreements that gave superior bene· fits or even bilateral concessions to the former .
Mere believeing in the merits of seeking arms cont.m. must
be backed up by a 'vvell-reasoned negotiating strategy , something
which the United States , to its great disfavor, has not had.
American dilemmas about whether to bargain from strength, and,
what actions should be accomplished on a unilateral rather than
a bilateral basis, have not only hindered our efforts against
the highly prepared Russians, but actually have proven counterproductive to our goal of. reducing tensions.

Both the SALT-l

and Vladivostok agreements were · ' losely worded and technically
deficient which forced the United states to attach non-binding

unilateral interperative statements to the original legal texts .
These of course have been thoroughly disregarded by the Russians
. who claim our interpretations are faulty
actual treaty.

an~ot

related to the

Thus, the United States, having fallen into the

old trap of converting mere honorable intentions into hard facts
and then extrapolating this optimisti'c logic to Kremlin. poiicymakers, now feels disillusioned with the entire spirit of detente
and is boosting the military ·even further.
The nroblem of whether the United States should negotiate
with the U. S.S.R . in a tough mariner and from a position of . strength,
or be willing to make large concessions to place some limits on
the enemy, is of great importance .

There is a general concens-us

that we were able to · ratify the ABM accord because of vastl JT
superior American technolog'J which the Russiansfel t compelled to
negate , although it meant their giving up a potentially vast
defensive system , som~thing they traditionally value~O

Yet there

is a question as to the validity of this exru;nple being converted
into a firm negotiating principle.
At the initial SALT talks, we bargained with no defined sel1se
of what we were after and therefore we were unable to assert our-·
selves properly .

An agreement did emerge, and the

Sovi~ts

were

subjected to a set of guidelines, however . our inability to deal
firmly with specifics enabled the Russians to wield the power .
e..nd demand concessions , a . fact which left us with a codification
of U. s. throw-vei..ght inferiority. Henry Rowen has said that 2l
there is a big difference between disparities which floyv
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from unilateral decisior.s which can be ahanged on the basis
of ne y'l technology or changed circmnst2nces and our accepting
in principle an unequal position i nt ended to exist for a
loT'l..g peri ad of ti:ne .
vVe must be able to stand up to the Russians in arms control
bargaining however how this should be done is a mat t er of .increasing speculation.

The .'previously mentioned Defense Intelligence
Agency detente report advised that the U. S. 22
need not hesitate to demand a clearly comparable price for
every concession the U.S. or West is prepared to ma..1{e.
This opinion

ste~~ed

for the finding that detente has served the

Soviets well and therefore they are not prepared to lightly jet~ison

this policy .
If Vie accept the belief that the United States

shou~d

be

equally compensated for all it gives up, 'tie must further examine
how this is to be done.
The first rationale would have us promote bilateral arms
control by matching the Soviets step for step or if possible,
surpassing them.

In the later case, UrS. superiority would be

used in much the same way as it was during the ABrii negotiations .
The more moderate view of maintaining essential parity with the
Russians is based on the hope that the

CO~llunists,

thwarted in

their attempts to tip the strategic balance in their favor, will
rationally want to reduce force l evels.

The logic is sound but

the concessions drawn from the Soviet Union may be offset by the
rigorous demands this strategy places on the United

States~

In

the long rtU1, our armed forces will be made up of weapons systems
devised as bargaining chins rather than equipment that is necessary
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for deterrence , the most cost-effective , and so on .
two reasons for this .

First , on occasions where

There are

th~ussians

are

not convinced by our show of strength, we vlill ' be stuck with
equipment we really don't need.

And secondly, past experience

tells us that once defense programs

pro~ress

to the deployment

stage , a great . number of factors combine to ma-1{e eancellation
exceedingly difficult~3
Attempts to gain bargaining l everage through the creation of
strong forces-in-being will not best serve the interests of arms
control. ' Arriving at a similar conclusion, Ted Greenwood and
Michael Nacht have written in Foret gn Affairs that 24
••• linking American weapons development directly to Soviet
behavior ••• is needlessly constraining future policy choices
while simultaneously running the risk of building Soviet
overconfidence in their ability to control Ai"Ilerican procurement decisions.
The solution then, is arms control t hrough a strategy that
relies on our potential strength being just aE? persuasive to
the technology-awed Russ.ians as actual strength.

In oth.er words ,

by taking new weapons systems through the initial stages of development but then stopping them short of advanced testing and deployment, we will have bargaining chips t hat could affect the enemy
but. are not binding on ourselves .
In some cases, arms control agreements

ma~"

be reached before

ei ther side. can b egin research and development, ·as was the case
1,r,t i th the Sea-Bed and Outer Space treaties.

In other instances ,

' each C01?.ntry may be proceeding rapidly with a particular weapons
, system in anticipation of its being ' deployed ylhich will nake it
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t ougher for agreement s to be reached.

In this situation, the

United States should maintain an aggressive R&D program while
unilaterally declaring that the fruits of this process yull not
be made operational if the Sovi e ts exercise similar restraints .
If our lead is not followed , we will be left with two options.
If we decide after all that U.S . deployment would not add to the
stability of deterrence, we could simply put a halt to all

pre~

J]roduction activities, something which would not affec t force
l evels already in existance.

On the other hand, if the weapons

system is indeed necessary, we can put it into operation in sufficient ouantities to restore the balance and prove to the Soviets
that their added expenses have heen futile .
Finally, there may be circumstances where the Russians decide
to add destabiliz;i ng improvements to forces already in eXistance ,
forces which at the time, are basically equalled by the United
States .

Again, this calls for unilateral action by the

l~tter

which is conditional upon its being reciprocated at a later. date .
If an eque.l number of forces on each side i.s assumed to be the
strongest contribution to stability, then a freeze on present levels or a:r'maments should be called for.

lri other words, the U. S.

would eschew any improvements to its current hardware if the
Soviets promised to do the same .

The latters failure to comply

would be a signal to the United States to counter the Co:nnunists
moves in
status

8.

v:ay that would give us the upper hand in a revised
\Vhil e the gaining of superiority might be 1).!lJlece ssary

GUO .

mili tarily

8. S

well as a detrem·e nt · to cri sis stability , the overall
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balance would not be so profoundly affected so. as to thre<;l.ten a
fa:;Llure of deterrence, and the Soviets vvould be taught a lesson
in counter-productivity that would make the chances for arms control a lot easier in the future .
An obvious prerequisite for "Lmilateral arms limitations and
reductions is a very strong R&D posture by the United States.
Technology itself is inherently neutral and depending upon the
use to which it is put, i t can either exacerbate the arms race
or provide for a strengthening of deterrence .

America has a sub-

stantial scientific advantage over the Soviet Union, and manipulated properly , it can be our ultimate barga:;Lning chip in seeking
a slowing

dov~m

of the arms race.

The Russians have never offic-

ially stated that they' would reciprocate if we reduced our de-

fenses~5 however , Dr. Zhores Medvedev, a deported scientist, told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year that U. S . ini-

tiative~ in this direction would be followed~6 .
In trying to harness the arms race , negotiators should keep
in mind that adherence to treaty provisions must for the most
part be easily verifiabl e to both sides.

This is why the prime

opportunities for arms control almost always come· before a weapons
system has been deployed by either side; new technology must be
tested and this process is observable from e.nemy satellites and
listening posts.

MIRVs are a classical example of· · destabilizing

equipment becoming operational in numbers which are impossible to
ascertain by surveillance .

· :. - , , .
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There are currently two areas in particular where the United
States and the Soviet Union must co:ne to an agreement if we are
to avoid a drastic reshuffling of strategic deterrent forces.
These are I,IARV and submarine vulner2.bili ty.
At the present time, only the United States has the requisite
technology to build mARVs, and initial testing is being conducted
on a limited basis, however, it must be assumed that the. Russia..l1s
and
. will acquire the necessary skills as well/at some point in the
future, be able to threateri us just as we will be able to threaten
them.
is

The implications of these warheads on nuclear stability

enorr~ous

because, if allowed to beco;rle operational, they will

guarantee theyirnrnediate obselesence of every fixed target, softsited, in the hardest ·of silos, or even embedded in rock.

SLBMs

would have the ability to destroy ICB11s as l;vould mobile and airlaunched missiles, a dim prospect because these offensive systems
as they currently

exi~t

or as they are conceived, conribute to

deterrence by virtue of their inherent lack of pinpoint accuracy~7
Both the Soviet Union and the United States have the means
to compensate for the elimination of fixed ICBMs by moving to
place their deterrent forces aboard submarines and mobile missiles,
however this is not wholly desirable.
liIl_~

The command and control

between government officials· 8.!ld sublllarines or mobile missile

unit military personnel is drastically mor:-e weak than that of
silo-based forces.

Thus, the effect

o~.

crisis stability of

each SU"DerDOWer believing .in the vi.:.lnerabili ty of its cO:mlunications
J.

•

system can be readily observed.

A policy of la"LIDch-on-';.'arning

.. I;.

~

•
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would be mandated and the worst-case analyist s could paint a
scenario like thi s : a surprise salvo of MARVed depressed-trajectory
SLBMs destroys the entire American communications network, rendering us incapable of

co~~unicating

with our sea-based deterrent,

mobile mi ss ile unit s , or our early warning satellites.

fIloments

later, the Soviets launch an attaok on our mobile missiles and
remaining fixed missiles with their MARVed ICBMs.

They have

been keeping careful tabs on the location of the mobile forces
through their recon satellites so they are able to re-target their
missiles to hone right in on ours.

The U.S. 1.S left with no

land-based strike weapons (the bombers having been destroyed by
the initial SLBMs) and without any way of commu.nicating V'rith the
sub force.

The Russians then proceed to . attack Western Europe

wi th a wide range of c'onventional, tactical and strategic nuclear
forces, destroying half of it but taking full control by parachuting in thousands of troops.

She then warns the United States

that when communications are restored, any SLBM attack on the
9-0viet Union will result in the destruction of American citie s .
This scenario is ridiculous for a

nTh~ber

of reasons. To name

just one, there can be no iron clad guarantee that all the . communication links and all
will be destroyed.

th~ombers

and all the mobile missiles

But a nuclear holocost isnot something to be

taken lightly-it can mean the e.nd of everything we hold -dear to
us-and even though deterrence will almost certainly be maintained
'Hi th or

\7i thout

MARVs, we should not allo1;'1 ?ursel vesto be placed

in a situation where peace is sutained at barely minimal levels.
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Al though hi gh levels of ue t errence are theoretically uP~~ecessary ,
if we can dou1:ELy or triply insure that the risks of using nuclear
weapons remain great, this extra protection must be considered
worthwhile.
Whether or not the

U~S.

and Russia deny themsleves the use

of mfL.'1.el..J.vering re-entry vehicles, increasingly accurate mIRVs
will continue to make fixed ICBMs more and more
first strike.

vu~nerable

to a

As this occurs, increasing numbers of deterrent

forces will put to sea where the offense has a distinct advantage
over the defense .

Nevertheless, it will only bea matter of time

before som.e ASW advances are achieved and strategists begin to
worry about submarmine vulnerability, producing a new . .vaye of
uneasiness and arms building.
To avoid this problem which is always recurring b ecause no
one is ever really confident in deterrence , it has been proposed
that sections of the ocean be designated as s,a nctuaries , available
to thE?fuilitary forces of one but not both of the

superpowers~8 .

This would allow' SSBNs to cruise freely without fear of ASW c:l.r1d
provide for an assured second-strike capability no weaker than
the ship-to-shore cormnand and control link.

UI1~awful

incursions

by one side into the others sanctuaries could be easily detected
so there is reason to believe that this type of agreement would
not be abrogated.

Because of the need for precise-definitions

of boundaries, incll1.ding the geographical dimensions, and the
airspace above it, a submarine sanctuary agreement does not lend
itself to a unilateral declaration by the United states .

There

(117)
...

has been nothing written in public to suggest that this t opic has
ever been discussed by America and the U.S.S . R.

At this point, we should be able to draw some conclusions as
to the future force posture that will draw the United States and.
the Soviet Union farthest away from any temptation to use nuclear
weapons.

This concluding section contains my recommendations on

how the former can direct itself and the Russians towards a stable '
peace.

I repeat once more that all odds favor the unbroken con-

tinua...."1ce of deterrence and that my proposals ar.e merely designed
to overwhelmingly convince ourselves and our enemy ·of this fact.
The American strategic Triad has served us well in the past
however it is now in I+eed of revamping.. SLBMs are rapidly becoming
the greatest single hedge against a 'pre-empti veattack arid thv.s
should be retained however I propose that we graduall;wPhase 01,lt
the manned bomber fleet t scrap the cruise missile program, B.nd
reduce our dependence on fixed ICBids by making the MX ava'ilable
in either a land-mobile or silo-base'd mode.
My stance on the sea-based deterrent needs no elaboration .
As long as we continually update the commu..'l1.ications · lin..'k: behveen
submarines and land, the U.S. vlil.l place a great deal of trust
in the SSBN, trust which leads to confidence which in turn precludes our doing anything rash during a· crisis. . Furthermore,
although the possibility is remote, any breakthroughs in ASW
will be easily detected and thus subject to neutralization or
abolishm.ent by treaty .
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It iB alvvays hard for a branch of the

Armed Forces to give

up a senti'llental. favori te, the battleship being a case in point ,
however the strategic balance and weapons technology .have e\doved
to a degree which eliminates any need for manned bombers .

Current

justification for the B-52 and the forthcoming B-1 centers around
three factors : marked Soviet fear of these vveapons which is evidenced by their massive defenses and their behavior at the SALT

ta1:ks~9 the 'r einforcement aircraft give to the missile tnreat':O
and the need for an alternative to missiles should the Soviets
violate the ABM treaiy~l

These are valid considerations ' however

it is evident that the danger of Soviet existing and potential
counteractions more than outweigh the planes contribution to the
United States deterrent force.
It follows that . the Russians are going to do every thin possible to eliminate the source of their fear,

fu~d

so far, this flas

manifesteli itself in the collossal air-defense network protecting
the

U.S.S~R.

It also follows that if the United States goes ·ahead

vvi th a new system, the B-1, which is designed to penetrate enemy
airspace with greater effectiveness, the Soviet Union will
the increased threat with nev" systems of her

0%"1.

meet

These may take

the form of stronger homeland defenses, but then again, because
of the acknowledged U. S. lead in electronic counter-measure', technology , she may look for more success in finding ways t o destroy
the hombers before they leave the ground.
B-1 will

This means that the

serve as an invitation to the Soviets to develop de-

pressed-trajectory missiles or other

me t hod~

of attacking the
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United States , a prospect we surely wish to avoid .
The argument that missiles and bombers reinforce each other
in the Triad is harder to

disco~mt .

If a Soviet strike was de-

signed to simultaneously destroy the two , advance warning of the
Comrnunis.t ICBM launch Vlould enable our bombers to take off and
avoid destruction from SLEMs.

And if Russian ICBMs and SLBMs

were fired simultaneously, our missiles will have ·· time
flight.

Furt~ermore,

it is said that missiles will

to~·take

cl~ar

the way

for subsequent bomber attacks on targets not initially destroyed.
Why then phase out this portion of the U.S. offensive forces?
There are several reasons.

An American military posture that

only includes missiles significantly reduces the threat from
Russian SLEMs which are not . able to destroy hard targets.

rfIore-

over, the elimination oiibombers will still leave the Soviets . with
the massive problem of simultaneously destroying our ICBMs and
our fleet of Poseidon. and Trident submarines, provided of course
that we have already opted not to ride out the attack a..."'1d to

It is calculated that twenty percent of the land and seabased missiles of either side will fail to complete their mission
due to guidance system failures, the inability of the warhead to
explode , or the initial incapacitation of the rocket engines~2
When the effect of fratricide is t acked on, it is clear beyond
a shadow of a doubt that a Soviet firs-strike will fall short of
knocking out . all , or even close to all of our fixed ICBms.
same holds true for our cOInmunications links with the SSBNs.

The
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Just as a Rus$ian use of MARVs would not render ther:;, immune
from the problems associated 'ivi th less than

1001~

weapons reliability,

a Sovie t decision to abrogate the provisions of the SALT-l accord
and deploy an ABWf system would not give them a ' remote chance of
intercepting ail our missiles .

On this basis, any presumption

th'a t we need bombers as a hedge against a Soviet ABliI threat is
inherently faulty.

First of all, a Soviet dec'ision to break the

treaty would sabatoge their efforts to ' harness A.."!lerican nuclear
capabilities as the latter would no longer be willing to enter
into any agreements .

Secondly, Soviet ABM deployment on a scale

necessary to defend the entire couritry will, provide strong in...,
centive to the United States to do likewise, something the Russians
do not want because of ' our technological lead in this area.

Fi-

nally, it is believed that both the Galosh and Sa.feguard ABM
systems are largely ineffective and therefore incapable of ,pr.eventing large scale damage~3

Eve~ worst-case analyists conceiving

of a reliable 8....11.ti-missile defense would also be forced to admit
that such a system is subject to saturat ion by increased

n~"!lbers

of U. S. laT:J-nchers.
In eliminating

m8....~ed

bombers from the force structure, we

should be a,;vare that this move might be u sed to gain concessions
from the Soviet Union.

Rather than publicly announcing our plans

to retire the B-52s 2nd cancel the :a-I project, the Unite,d States
c01J~d

attemp t to negotiate a link betvveen these actions and limits

on the Backfire , or preferably, depressed .... trajectory

SLB~:s .

AI-

though we v:ill eventually scrap our bombers whether or not the
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Soviets reciprocate , it is werth a try a t curbing the arms race.
If the U.S. can keep its intentions secret , itwould be in
a strong position to make the proposed demands.

With certain

modifications , the B-52s have a potential service life of fifteen
more years .

As for the B-1 , a number of prototypes are now flying

however a firm production decision is yet to be made .

Should the

project be cancelled and subsequently the U.S. felt ' a great
need for bombers, it could be resurrected, and in a far shorter
time than it would take the Soviets to build a nation-wide ABM
system.

The land-based missile segment of t he American strategic
offensive Triad, while' on the whole more vulnerable than our seabased forces, is thE7fuost essential contributing factor to deterrence because it promises practically unthinkable destruction
from large and accurate megaton devices .

This is not to imply

that bombers and SLBMs are incapable of inflicting enough damage
to support deterrence.

It is just that the existance of single

pieces of hardware that can kill millions of people has been more
influential in convincing both sides that deterrence is real than
its less Dotent counterDarts in the Triad.
J.

_

I have already pointed out that land-base.d missiles are
becoming more and more vulnerable, just as I have mentioned that
the limits · of this vulnerability vvill further the maintenance of
deterrence .

However, I believe that changes in our missile de-

ployment are necessary.
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In kee:ping with the notion that deterrence should be ' doubly
or triplelJ insured, the United States must make an effort · to
eliminate some of the 1054 fixed ICBIvIs and replace them 7ri th rnissiles which are land-mobile.

At present, · Vie do not know a great

deal about mobile ICBMs , however indications are that they will be
invulnerable to all but very advanced cruise missiles and bombers
on armed

reco~~aiss~~ce

flights, both of which can be adequately

countered.
The ability of mobile missiles to ride out an attack will
obviously give the President an opportunity t o delay a retaliatory
second-strike , thus avoiding a strategy of launch-on-warning.
Furthermore, these weapons, in allowing us to decrease the number
of fixed ICBT'II s , would enable the Soviets to reduce their throw- '
weight because they ';'lOuld have fewer targets to hit .
ca...~

Lastl;\{ , it

be marainally argued that a move to less accurate land-mobile

missiles vlill assure the enemy that we have no first-strilr,e intentions.
There are drawbacks t o this system but they are not of great
importance .

The biggest gripe about mobile ICBMs is that deploy-

ment by both sides will cause another missile gap due to the' difficul ty in ascertaining the si.ze of such forces~4
of this is open to question for tvvo reasons.

The validity

For one thing, modern

methods of satellite surveillance should give each side an appro:x;imate idee. of hov; many ICBMs are being carte d around the enemies
t erritory .

And sec 'o ndly, if both superpowers acquire

l~Yld-mobil e

missiles, numbers will not matter because under any circu.I!lstances
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they both will maintain an assured sec.ond-strike capability.
Additionally, mobil e ICBMs may be

ha~pered

by a less than secure

command and control link with Washington as well as an inability
to travel near population centers.

While the use of these weapons

will b e' l ess subject to Presidential direction than fixed forces r
they will be more trustworthy than submarines; the latter problem
can be avoided by a progra.'TI of warhead safeguarding similar to
the one used in Europe as well as by careful selection of dispersal ·
routes.
No matter hovv effective the land-mobile missile will be, the

U. S. should not replace more than half of the s ilo-based forces .
Not only are the ICm. .Is we now operate the most securely linked
portion of . the Triad to

cbmman~

and control, they constitute our

. greatest hard-target kill threat.

Srich attribute s ca n not be

completely discarded .
In a, way, the Russians have given us a mandate to deploy
mobile ICBrils by virtue of their decision to develop these weapons

themselves~5

Unle ss both sides have them, the added meaning they

lend to deterrence is lost-a fact which may be an invitation for .
some sort of agreement requiring a certain percentage of each '
nation ' s ICBM force to be operated in a mobile mode.

In completing the discussion on suggested U. S. force postures
that will hopefully provide strategic stability in the future ,
it is necessary to pass ju.dgement on the cruise mi-ssile, a weapon
now in the advanced R&D stage .

The relative merits of the se
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mini9,ture warheads have already been reviewed and I should add
that the aforementioned manned bomber proposals do not preclude
a completely independent evaluation of the cruise missile.
At no point now or in the foreseeable future will the United
States have a need for the cruise· missile.

The penetration ca-

pabili ties of ICBrlIs and SLBIvIs are assured and the improved aCcuracy which the ALerlI offers can easily be built into existing forces "
even -without Iv1ARV~6

In addition, the Soviets can be expected to

come up with suitable defensive measures by 1985, rendering the
cruise missile obsolete unless used in great :- -numbers .
This last point . actresses itself to the assertion made by some
that the ALCM will raise the nuclear threshold.

If they are laQ."'1-

ched on a massive scale , the Russians could not help but recognize
the U.S. in a hostile manner.

Even assuming that a few of these

weapons, with conventional warheads, are directed at the U. S. S.R.
before they can updat'i their air defenses,we can not expect the
Soviets to act calmly when they discover their hardened silos
being . destroyed.

An attack of this kind , whether using nuclear

or non-nuclear explosives, is simply too risky.
Would the Soviet Union go to vvar if we used one or tvvo cruise
an
missiles to destroy/important military target with a conventional
warhead?

We can not say for sure.

It is imaginable that Pentagon

strategists believe the answer is " no" .and that this wea:90ns would
-prove- idee.l for demonstrating American resolve in a crisis.

I

ask though: With a consta.Ylt threat of a Russian launch-on-vrarning,
v-That .possi ble circumstances would require of an armed pro.jectile
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into the airspace of the Soviet Union?

Naturally , I have not covered clo s e to all of the strategies
and weapons 'w hich make up the nuclear balance.

Any complete

discussion would have to cover alert rates, command, control ,
cOII:m.unications, attack warnings, survivability, systems reliability,
range, accuracy, and penetration capabili ties~7
may be b eyond discussion.

Yet these factors

The risks of trying to fully evaluate

them-and guessing wrongly':;'are simply too great.

There are more

than eno1...1.gh unknowns about every aspect of nuclear conflict to
insure t hat deterrence is never deliberately broken by the United
Stat es or the Soviet Union ..
What both superpovlers need to understand is not the likely
scenarios of a nuclear war and thcrbest, preparations for it ; , thlS ,
they can never do.

Rather, we need to acquire a broader vision

of the full implications eminating from the diplomatic and military maneuvering which each side engages in.
to

This will helD us

wrap deterrence in more identifiable , and thus perBuasive ,

clothes.
The tmminent vulnerability of ha.rdened mi ss ile silos i s
going to force major alterations to the force structures of both
sides.

While these changes are being made, motivated as always

by fear', the dangers of an accident provoking a nuclear war will

be enhanced .

Therefore , the t±me is as. :tipe as ever for dialogue

between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We must come to

understand that cruise missiles and Backfire bombers are ult i-
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mately inconseauent ial to maintaining deterrence , and h ardlY worthv
L

of debate.

"_

The re al i ssued must be brought out of obscurity ,

although I admit that the prospects of the superpowers doing this
now seem rather dim.
Whether or not the Sovie t s care t o deal with the sUbstantive
issues of deterrenc e is a mat t er of con j ecture because no one in
the West, and possibly no one in the Kremlin, knows for sure what
goals they seek, both in the Jong

and short run.

As for the

United States , we vlillhave to understand that the Russians are
motivated. t o arm themselves as much because of China as because
of us.

Therefore we must be tolerant if their defensive needs

differ from our ovm.

Furthermore, we must keeu in mind that the

U. S. S. R. can not possibly regard us in t he same non-belligerent
l ight as vve see ourselves .

Since World War II , the United States

has introduce d every major weapons system except the ABM~8
In the history of oivilization, it is eatimated that the.
total amount of ammunition expended has been 10 rhegatons~9
one missile or bomb contains five times that much.

Today , .

The knowledge

of preventing their use is as important an issue as the ';'Vorld vvill
ever face .
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